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Essays on Open Market Operations, the Maturity Composition of the Public
Debt, and the Term Structure
Seth J. Kopchak
This dissertation addresses issues related to liquidity and market determination of interest
rates. Chapters two and three address the market for overnight loans of federal funds.
Deviations of the federal funds rate from its target can be interpreted as demand innovations
for federal funds. These demand shocks can be modeled as an unobserved component and
estimated using the Kalman filter to identify liquidity effects. The effect of a $1 billion
increase in the average sum of open market operations over a one-week period results in a
decrease of the federal funds rate by about 12 basis points. In addition, unexpected shocks
identify pressure on the funds rate target and isolate policy-motivated changes of the Fed’s
funds rate target from those resulting from interest rate smoothing. A metric of accumulated
demand pressure derived from the state space model is positively related to the size of open
market operations as well as the direction and likelihood of federal funds rate target changes
at Federal Open Market Committee meetings. The final chapter relates the effect of U.S.
Treasury auctions of notes and bonds to changes in relative discount yields. An event study
methodology is employed to test the hypothesis that off-the-run relative yields are insulated
from the effects related to the auction calendar. A statistically significant positive increase
in relative yields is associated with introduction of additional cashflows at the corresponding
and neighboring horizons. An analogous methodology is employed for on-the-run bonds,
finding a significant and longer lived negative effect at the benchmark five, ten, and 30-year
horizons.
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The price of lending, determined in markets governed by the supply and demand of assets,
informs almost all financial decision making. This dissertation investigates two critical mar-
kets where interest rates are determined, emphasizing the important role of supply effects
in these markets. Three central questions are addressed: (1) What are the liquidity effects
on the federal funds rate of open market operations? (2) Can the Fed’s policy for choosing
funds rate targets be characterized as accommodating or activist? (3) What are the effects
of debt management policy on the prices of outstanding treasury securities?
Chapter 2 presents identification and estimation of the liquidity effect of open market
operations. The Trading Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York buys and sells
bonds from banks, changing the overall supply of base money. A model of their objective to
minimize the deviation of the realized rate from the target obtains a structural model where
deviations of the target rate are a function of the demand forecast miss. Estimates of the
unobservable demand forecast are found using the Kalman filter and used to identify the
liquidity effect.
The result, that an increase in weekly open market operations of $1 billion will lower the
average federal funds rate in that period by 12 basis points, suggests that the funds market
1
is less liquid than previously estimated.
Chapter 3 develops a measure of market pressure exerted on the funds rate target. The
cumulative sum of demand-forecast errors describes the persistence of innovations in demand
which exceed the Fed’s expectation. The change of funds rate target in the direction of the
accumulated pressure supports the hypothesis that an accommodating policy of interest
rate smoothing is in place. As hypothesized, the size of open market operations is negatively
related to the measure of inter-FOMC meeting pressure on the target federal funds rate, and
the accumulated pressure metric has a positive and significant effect on the probability of
an increase in the target rate.
Chapter 4 investigates the relationship between U.S. Treasury auctions and the off-the-
run yield curve. By examining discount yields constructed from off-the-run treasury prices
during auction events, an event study approach finds an increase in relative yields at the
auction horizon. The absorption effect of the additional supplies of future cashflows on the
debt influences relative yields at the auction horizons and neighboring maturities. Since
off-the-run bonds are used to calculate the discount rate, the effect is measured apart from
the premium paid for highly liquid newly issued bonds.
2
Chapter 2
The Liquidity Effect of Open Market
Operations
2.1 Introduction
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Open Market Trading Desk (the Desk) conducts
sales and purchases debt securities to achieve its mandate from the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC.) Kos (2004) reports the directive of the Desk, “. . . to foster conditions in
the reserves market consistent with maintaining the federal funds rate at an average around
a specified target rate.” The federal funds rate, the price negotiated between depository
institutions (banks hereafter) for overnight loans between accounts at the Fed, serves as the
primary instrument for the implementation of monetary policy and, thus, is an integral link
in the transmission process of policy to the economy.
Banks manage reserve balances to meet statutory requirements and also to facilitate
check clearing and transfers. During the two-week maintenance period, which ends on a
Wednesday, banks must hold, by daily average, an FOMC-determined fraction of their total
demand-deposit account holdings as reserves. These reserves include deposits in accounts
at the Fed, (federal funds), and currency in the bank’s vaults. Since 1998, the reserve
requirement must be met against demand-deposit balances held over a computation period
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two maintenance periods earlier. Under this accounting convention, banks possess knowledge
of the required average-reserve balance during the maintenance period. However, uncertainty
remains regarding realized current-period transfers, deposits, and withdrawals. Additionally,
banks may autonomously choose to hold excess reserves against the possibility of overdrafts
or for other private purpose. Thus, a bank’s maintenance-period demand for additional
federal funds is not strictly determined by the regulatory requirement.
Since reserves at the Fed do not pay interest,1 balances in excess of operating and reg-
ulatory requirements are undesirable. Banks holding excess reserves may choose to lend to
banks with shortfalls, with the price of borrowing determined by the supply and demand
of those funds. Borrowing and spending behavior of the institutions’ customers, borrowing
from the Fed’s discount window, transfers into U.S. Treasury accounts and, thus, out of the
pool of traded federal funds, as well as the Fed’s choices regarding the exhaustion or injection
of funds through open market purchases or sales of securities, all affect the overall quantity
of reserves available and thus the demand for additional funds supplied by the Fed.
In this study, the identification of the relationship between the market rate for overnight
loans and the quantity of funds supplied through open market operations is achieved using
a structural model of the market for federal funds, with demand shocks modeled as an
unobservable component. The approach provides a context for the funds rate target in terms
of interest rate smoothing hypothesis and an estimate of the liquidity effect of open market
operations. In this framework, deviations from the target rate are a function of the Fed’s
demand forecast miss. In particular, data describing the Desk’s open market transactions
1 The announcement by the Board of Governors on October 6, 2008 de-
scribes a change in this policy enacted after the period under study here. See
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081006a.htm
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permits estimation of the market demand forecast miss, by way of maximum likelihood
estimation and the Kalman filter algorithm. The model solution takes advantage of the
theories of rational expectations and adaptive learning to estimate the ratio of permanent to
temporary innovations in the demand for funds supplied through open market operations.
Section 2.2 provides context on the liquidity effect in the funds market. Section 2.3
develops the model of the market for non-borrowed reserves, finding the solution to the
Desk’s decision problem for choosing the size of each week’s net open market operations.
Section 2.5 reports on the data and results from model estimation, and the relationship with
the hypothesis stated in section 2.4.
2.2 The Liquidity Effect
Thornton (2001) discusses attribution of the phrase “liquidity effect” to Milton Friedman,
relating to the hypothesized negative association between the supply of money and nominal
interest rates. In the context of the federal funds market, the liquidity effect refers to the
specific relationship between the supply of federal funds and the overnight lending rate;
an increase in the supply of reserve balances brings about a lower federal funds rate. The
elusiveness of an accurate and non-controversial estimate for the magnitude and properties of
the liquidity effect is commonly, and perhaps correctly, attributed to the difficulty isolating
exogenous policy activity of the Federal Reserve from the effect of the Fed’s anticipation
of the expected funds rate, the market’s anticipation of the Fed’s future actions, or other
endogenous factors.
Each day, the Trading Desk determines the type and size of open market operations to be
initiated, based on forecasts regarding the market for reserves. The transactions are executed
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and the funds rate and market conditions are monitored.2 Estimates for the path of reserve
balances are altered based on the behavior of the funds rate and any new information. A
liquidity effect implies the funds rate will firm when the Fed reduces the supply of reserves
available to banks, and will soften when reserve levels are augmented, but this simple relation
need not always hold. For example, expectations of lower future rates might depress current
demand moving the funds rate lower, in absence of a contemporaneous increase in supply.
Seasonally driven reserve demand, discount window borrowing, or other influences of the
banking sector may cause the Desk to conduct open market operations which affect the funds
market differently from those prescribed by a strict liquidity-effect analysis. Furthermore, a
large portion of open market operations are made to offset fluctuations in reserve levels due to
changes in U.S. Treasury balances, the impact of check float, expected demand fluctuations,
or other autonomous variability which affect the supply of nonborrowed reserves.
Closely related antecedent studies examine the liquidity effect at a high frequency. Hamil-
ton (1997) delivers an important innovation to the approach for estimating the liquidity ef-
fect. He proposes that the Desk’s forecast miss of U.S. Treasury account adjustments serves
as an instrument of exogenous changes in the supply of reserves, and estimates the daily
liquidity effect. Following the treatment of Gilchrist (2001), discussing Thornton (2001), the
high frequency liquidity effect models focusing on the supply and demand of total reserves
can be summarized by the system:
TRdt = βffrt + v
d
t
TRst = Bt + v
s
t .
Where the supply of total reserves is adjusted by the Desk, with the objective to supply B∗t ,
2Feinman (1993) provides a detailed examination of the operational procedure of the Trading Desk.
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Here, vst , v
d
t , and ωt are i.i.d. and ωt equals the control error for the desired level of reserves.






(vst − vdt − ωt),
obtaining a result analogous to the solution of this paper’s model developed below. Hamil-
ton estimates supply forecast misses which serve as an instrument for vst and estimates the
liquidity effect of total reserves, 1/β. Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) use a more comprehen-
sive and accurate measure of the same forecast miss, and find an estimable liquidity effect,
but one that according to Carpenter and Demiralp (2008), imply, “the change in balances
necessary for even a 25-basis point change in funds rate would lead to implausibly large open
market operations.”
Thornton (2001) disputes the effectiveness of Hamilton’s approach, citing sensitivity of
results to a small subset of days with large spikes in the funds rate. Thornton (2006) re-
assesses the contribution of Carpenter and Demiralp (2006), and finds a very small, but
statistically significant liquidity effect, with little practical economic significance. Thornton
(2007), noting that the Fed can not judge perfectly the magnitude of autonomous factors
affecting reserve supply such as currency, float, and the Treasury balance, investigates an
operating policy rule for open market operations for a liquidity effect, with particular atten-
tion paid to the conduct of operations at the time of target changes. Not finding convincing
evidence, he proposes an explanation; market forces may drive interest rates higher or lower,
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relieving the Fed of the requirement to conduct sizable open market operations to affect
changes in the market rate. This paper seeks to bridge the gap between the previous work
on the liquidity effect and that suggesting market forces may influence the Fed’s conduct
and choice of interest rate target.
Here, the procedure concentrates on the fact that as the desk conducts an open mar-
ket purchase for example, the counterparties’ accounts are credited by the Trading Desk,
and thus, nonborrowed reserves are increased. This instantaneous change in nonborrowed
reserves occurs without measurement error. The fact that some, if not most, of any open
market operation is made to offset or sanitize idiosyncratic fluctuations in reserves resulting
from factors such as float, currency demand, or Treasury balance adjustments, is not under
dispute. These factors are completely independent of the Fed’s influence, and manifest as
innovations of demand for additional funds supplied by open market operations.
Hamilton (1997) addresses the possibility that the liquidity effect estimated using an
instrument for the supply of reserves may be in part incorporating the influence in the
demand-for-reserves function. However, both Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) and Hamilton
present models which rely on dummy variables corresponding to features of the calendar to
control for these variations in demand. The approach developed here utilizes data directly
observable to market participants in real time, and models the unobserved innovations in
demand as an unobserved component estimated using the Kalman filter. Since the Desk
supplies additional reserves inelastically to achieve the target rate, there is no distinction
between a (positive) demand forecast error and a supply forecast error resulting in insufficient
funds to achieve the target rate.
Instead of attempting to isolate exogenous from endogenous changes in the level of re-
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serves, the present study uses a model of adaptive expectations to model the persistence
in the idiosyncratic innovations of demand for reserves which manifest as deviations from
the target rate. By utilizing a state space formulation, the model isolates the temporary,
idiosyncratic shocks absorbed by defensive open market operations from persistent innova-
tions in the demand for federal funds. The estimate of the Fed’s expectation of each period’s
demand permits identification of the slope of the demand curve.
2.3 A Model of the Desk’s Decision
Weekly demand for funds Rdt depends linearly on the federal funds rate, ffr, a stochastic
demand component, δ, and a vector of known, seasonal or calendar factors influencing the
level of demand, X,
Rdt = Ψ
′Xt + βffrt + δt. (2.1)
The demand shock δ segments the disturbance to demand into two components. One por-
tion, ε, manifests as idiosyncratic noise; the other, η, evolves following a random walk with
constant drift.
δt = ηt + εt, εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε) (2.2a)
ηt = µ + ηt−1 + ξt, ξt ∼ N(0, σ2ξ ). (2.2b)
The supply of reserves equals the level of reserves at the beginning of period t, plus the net
open market operations (OMOs) initiated by the Desk,
Rst = R
s
t−1 + OMOt. (2.3)
9










(Rst −Ψ′Xt − δt) .
(2.4)
The choice of open market operation minimizes the difference between the target and ex-
pected market funds rate, subject to the equilibrium condition that the supply of funds
equals the demand.
The Desk determines the size of the net open market operation at time t, based on
its knowledge of the parameters β and Ψ. Figure 2.1 shows a timeline for the choice and
information discovery. The total demand shock is realized and the market funds rate is
observed at the end of the period. While the components of the shock are not observed,
they may be inferred in part, given the set of parameter estimates.
As Rst = Rt−1 +OMOt, and with the Fed’s expectation that the day’s realized rate equal
the target, Et−1ffrt = ffr
∗
t , the solution to (2.4) determines the supply of reserves selected by






t + Et−1δt. (2.5)
In equilibrium, (2.1) and (2.5) find the deviation of the realized funds rate from target is a
function of the difference between realized and expected demand shock,
β(ffr∗t − ffrt) = δt − Et−1δt. (2.6)
Consideration of equation (2.6) in the context of the demand equation (2.1) and the discus-
sion from section 2.2 demonstrates why naive estimation of the relationship between reserves
supplied by open market operations and the federal funds rate will provide biased estimates.
Since δ, is correlated with the realized deviation from the funds rate target, the assumption
10
of orthogonal error terms necessary for unbiased ordinary least squares estimates is violated
in the direct estimation of equation (2.1).
An alternative approach to the intuition of the result of (2.6) follows from the adaptive
expectations formulation of Nerlove (1958), Cagan (1956), and specifically, the updating
Equation (2.7) derived explicitly from the Kalman filter algorithm in appendix A. In any
period t − 1, the previous period forecast of δ, Et−2δt−1, can be evaluated in light of the
new information about the true value of the state vector obtained through the measurement
equation.
Etδt+1 = µ + Et−1δt + λ(δt − Et−1δt). (2.7)
Equation (2.7) describes the evolution of information discovery that the Fed uses to determine
the size of future open market operations. Assuming that the Fed knows the true values
β and the hyperparameter Ψ, or at least that the Fed is not systematically incorrect in
its expectations, the decomposition of the disturbances is achievable. After observing the
market realization of the funds rate each period—in the context of the intended target—
the question of interest is the proportion of the deviation from target which is attributed
to transitory versus permanent influences. If, for instance, an unexpectedly large quantity
of funds are withdrawn from the banking sector during a particular week, the Fed will
learn through account reporting and the behavior of the rate. If the disturbance implies
a permanent increase in demand for base money the shock will require larger open market
operations. On the other hand, if the deviation from target is a temporary shock it will have
no effect on the future path of reserves.
Setting the structural model in state space form, decomposition of the forecast miss into
the temporary and permanent components is achieved by the Kalman filter. Appendix A
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provides details and derivation of the Kalman algorithm. Translation of the model above
into state space form is straightforward. Writing the measurement equation, the observed
series R, in terms of the unobserved component δ:
Rt = Ψ
′Xt + βffrt + δt, (2.8a)
and transition equations describing the state process:
δt = ηt + εt (2.8b)
ηt = µ + ηt−1 + ξt. (2.8c)




ε), and represents the new
information contained in period t − 1’s forecast error, to be included in the forecast for δt.
The errors ε are transitory, idiosyncratic noise, and those of ξ are persistent. Regardless of
the variance of ε, the optimal next-period forecast equals zero. If the variance of ξ is high
relative to the variance of ε, then the information content of (δ−E(δ)) is high. The fraction
of forecast error attributed to the persistent component of δ is relatively greater, and so,
a larger percentage of that error is expected to transmit to the following period. Section
2.5.1 reports maximum likelihood results of the Kalman filter algorithm for the system of
equations (2.8).







t + Et−1δt − Et−2δt−1. (2.9)










t−1 − ffrt−1). (2.10)
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This form of the model expresses the Desk’s mandate in terms of a policy directive to provide
additional funds which will account for the trend in demand (µ), to offset effects related
to the calendar (X), for any change in the target (ffr∗), and to account for the portion
of the previous period’s target miss attributable to a permanent shock, (ffr∗ − ffr). The
parameter λβ captures how much the Fed must compensate for the permanent component
of the previous day’s forecast miss, given the elasticity of the rate to open market operations.










t−1 − ffrt−1) + et. (2.11)
The error term et in (2.11) results from the unobserved effects influencing the Desk’s choice
of open market operation not included in the updating rule of (2.7). These effects are
not systematically correlated to the realization of the federal funds rate, since the Desk’s
objective is to minimize the difference between the target and rate. Errors which occur in
reaching this objective should, under the paradigm of rational expectations, result in neither
consistently high or low levels of the federal funds rate. Suppose for example, that because
of an event such as the distribution of an economic stimulus check or tax rebate, the Desk
determines that a maintenance period will require a larger net open market operation than
that specified by (2.7). An augmentation of that period’s operation serves to sanitize the
effect of the additional demand for federal funds, with the intention of equating the rate
to the target. Therefore, any deviation from target as a result of forecast error will not be
systematically high or low.
There is likewise no systematic relationship between the contemporaneous error and the
lagged value of the target miss. Lagged deviations from target capture the relevant state of
the market during the previous period, reflecting the failure, or unwillingness of the Fed to
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provision reserves precisely to equate demand and supply at the target. These deviations are
typically quite small, display little persistence, and previous period target misses would not
inform economic decisions affecting market conditions in period t. Along with the results of
the ordinary least squares estimates of (2.11) in section 2.6.1 a full information maximum
likelihood specification provides a robustness check for bias resulting from a correlation
between the lagged federal funds rate and the error term.
2.3.1 Identification
As discussed in section 2.2, studies of the high-frequency liquidity effect have concentrated
on the supply shocks which originate from Treasury balance forecasts and other disturbances
in the supply of reserves. The intuition behind the model described in section 2.3 is that
there is a relationship between the federal funds rate and demand for additional nonborrowed
reserves. The unexpected impact of factors like check float, unexpected currency demand,
or even increased discount window borrowing are relevant in this context only insofar as
that they increase the value of δ, the unobservable component of demand for additional
funds in excess of E(δ), the forecast of the demand component made by the Fed. Factors
which permanently influence the end-of-day period of supply of funds affect the next period’s
demand for additional nonborrowed reserves, and manifest in the model above through the
forecast of the next period’s demand for open market operations, Etδt+1. The temporary
component of δ, attributable to shortages or surpluses which will be reversed in the very
short term, do not contribute to the forecast.
Since the mandate of the Desk is to provide additional or fewer funds to facilitate trading
on average around the target rate, the Desk’s failure to achieve that objective manifests in
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a market rate different from the target. Figure 2.2 depicts the strategy for identifying the
slope of the demand curve. All else equal, the size of the open market operation for each
period equals the forecast of the unobserved demand component. If the target is unchanged,
and the Desk acts to sanitize any demand shock, an open market operation equal to Et−1δt
will leave the rate unchanged. If the realized rate differs from the target, the difference is
a function of the error in the Desk’s forecast. It is the additional structure of the Trading
Desk’s “learning function” that allows estimation of the slope parameter. Some part of the
forecast miss was noise, and another signal. If innovations in demand show persistence, then
information from the target miss is incorporated into the next period’s forecast, and the
slope of the demand curve is identified.
2.4 Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1: The Supply of Additional Reserves Provided by Open Market
Operations Decreases the Realized Federal Funds Rate.
Previous literature has addressed the relationship between the supply of reserves and the
federal funds rate, yielding mixed results. The market reaction to high frequency monetary
policy in the interbank overnight market has not been conclusively resolved. All else equal, an
increase in the supply of funds via open market operations increases the supply of reserves
and decreases the market price of those reserves, the federal funds rate. In terms of the




′Xt + βffrt + δt, (2.12)
∂ffr
∂Rt
< 0 =⇒ 1
β
< 0. (2.13)
2.5 Data and Estimation
For each week t, ending January 5, 2000 through December 19, 2007, the level of open
market operation supplied reserves, Rt equals the Thursday-through-Wednesday average of
accumulated new, less expiring, temporary and permanent daily open market operations, as
reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The Federal Reserve also provides the
transactions-weighted average of the federal fund and target rates ffrt, ffr
∗
t . The remaining
regressors, collectively labeled Xt, are a matrix of 0/1 dummies accounting for the effects
related to the calendar. Positive elements correspond to weeks which include the first days
of months and quarters, weeks which include the first business day after the 15th of each
month, and for all weeks in the month of December. These periods are associated with
atypically high payroll, spending, and government transfer activity. Additionally, dummies
are included for FOMC meetings and target changes, the second week of the maintenance
period, and the entire maintenance period during and the week following the terrorist attacks
of September 2001.
In the sample under study, the average net open market operation equals $0.77 billion.
In the six weeks with 25 basis point reductions in the funds rate target, the average net
open market operation equals $0.67 billion. For the 19 weeks with 25 basis point increases
in the target rate, the average net open market operation equals $0.89 billion. These values
are $0.11 billion less and more than the average open market operation of $0.77 billion
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respectively. The only 50 basis point increase in the target corresponds to a change equal
to −$2.31 billion, and the ten 50 basis point reductions in the target occur with an average
operation of $5.5 billion. Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for net open market operations
during weeks with target rate changes.
2.5.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimates of State Space Model
Table 2.3 displays the maximum likelihood estimates for the state-space model of (2.8).
As predicted by hypothesis 1, the parameter estimate of primary interest, the relationship
between the funds rate and reserves supplied through open market operations ∂ffr/∂R =
1/β̂ < 0. The value of β̂ = −8.10 implies that an increase in the average sum of open market
operations of $1 billion results in a decrease of the federal funds rate by 1/β̂ = 12.34 basis
points. Since, in general, maximum likelihood estimates are asymptotically normal, a 95%
confidence interval for β̂ equals β̂ ± 1.96 · σ̂β̂ = (−11.68,−4.51).
The components of the hyperparameter Ψ̂, show that operations are larger in the second
week of the maintenance period, December, the week of the 15th, and last of the month.
Of the 69 FOMC meetings during the sample period, 16 coincided with announcement of a
change to a lower funds rate, 20 to a higher funds rate, and the remaining 33 announcing no
change. A relatively high parameter estimate of 6.567 is associated with the six unannounced
meetings. Four of the six unscheduled FOMC meetings resulted in lower funds rate targets.
The other two, occurring in the weeks of August 10 and 18, 2007 follow a scheduled meeting
the week ending August 3, 2007. August and September mark a turbulent period in the
2007 financial crisis. None of the August meetings resulted in a change to the target rate.
During the week the markets reopened following the 2001 attacks on the World Trade
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Center the Fed announced a lower target and open market operations combined for a net
effect of $46.5 billion. In the weeks following the attacks, the target rate would be lowered
by 100 basis points. The high parameter estimates of 18.18 and 7.2 on dummies spanning
this period reflect that increased activity. On average, larger open market operations are
conducted during weeks including the first days of the first and third quarters. Statistically
insignificant parameter estimates are reported for the first weeks of quarters two and four.
The standard error estimates for the transitory and permanent components of demand
are σ̂ε = 2.572 and σ̂ξ = 2.411 respectively, with constant drift in η, µ̂ = 0.733. The




ξ )= 0.467. The standard error of
this function of parameters λ̂(σ̂2ξ , σ̂
2
ε) = 0.0395. The Kalman gain as estimated within the
state space procedure quickly (after t = 7) converges to the steady-state value of 0.596. The
estimate reports that the permanent component accounts for 59.6% of each period’s forecast
miss. The remaining 40.4% comes from idiosyncratic noise, and does not influence the next
period’s forecast of demand.
2.5.2 Relationship with Previous Results
Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) find estimates for the daily liquidity effect for each of the 10
business days of the maintenance period. Their results suggest that, on average, an increase
of $1 billion to reserve balances will lower the daily funds rate by one basis point. However,
a $1 billion addition to reserves on the last day of a maintenance period will result in a
3.41 basis point reduction in the funds rate. Based on their results, for the second week
of a maintenance period, a $1 billion increase in reserves on Settlement Wednesday will
lower the average weekly funds rate by 0.487 basis points, and average weekly reserves by
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$0.1429 billion. These estimates suggest that significant quantities of funds are necessary to
bring about changes the size of typical target adjustments. The average daily liquidity effect
suggests an increase of $25 billion to reserves would be needed to effect a 25 basis point
reduction in the average weekly funds rate. Hamilton (1997) finds an open market sale of
$420 million occurring on the last day of the maintenance period will increase the funds rate
by 10 basis points.
The liquidity effect estimated by Carpenter and Demiralp (2006), following a similar
technique of Hamilton (1997), addresses the supply of reserves directly. Their use of the
instrument for changes in reserve balances produces values for the effect of changes directly
to the supply of reserves. The change in reserves affected by open market operations is
instantaneously equivalent to a change in reserves, although the quantity a bank chooses
to retain as reserve balances is then outside of the Fed’s direct influence. The liquidity
effect identified in this study finds the elasticity of the funds rate to open market operations,
or additional supplies of base money. While certainly these two measures are very closely
related, a strict 1:1 comparison of these liquidity effects is inappropriate. However, regardless
of this difference in specification, the liquidity effect of open market operation estimated here
finds the reserves market to be far less liquid than in previous studies, and can be interpreted
in terms of the observed operations conducted by the Fed.
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2.6 Robustness of Results to Alternative Specifications
2.6.1 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation











t−1 − ffrt−1) + et. (2.14)
Table 2.4 shows ordinary least squares the estimates for the specification (2.14). The param-
eter estimate of β̂ = −9.41 suggests a slightly smaller but not significantly different liquidity
effect from that found using maximum likelihood estimation of the Kalman filter, of 1/β̂ =
10.6 basis points. Parameter estimates for µ, and the hyperparameter Ψ are consistent with
those derived from the maximum likelihood approach.
The indirect least squares estimate of λ found by estimating equation (2.14) equals
λ̂β/β̂ = 0.95 with a 95% confidence interval of (0.557, 1.34). This result is not inconsis-
tent with the MLE estimate of λ = 0.59 found using maximum likelihood techniques.
As a robustness check against the possibility of correlation between the lagged federal










t−1 − λβffrt−1 + ε1t (2.15)
ffrt−1 = α1ffrt−2 + ε2t (2.16)
is estimated using full information maximum likelihood allowing for contemporaneous cor-
relation of errors ε1t and ε2t. Table 2.6 displays the results of estimation. The AR(1)
specification of ffrt−1 in (2.16) finds an R
2 = 0.99, and coefficient estimates of (2.15) not
statistically different from ordinary least square estimates of (2.14). This result supports the
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proposition that any simultaneity bias has neither a statistically or economically significant
influence upon the ordinary least squares estimates from (2.14). Estimation of the system
expanded in terms of the lagged funds rate and target opposed to the deviation from the
target rate circumvents the weak instruments problem that arises since weekly deviations
from target exhibit nearly no persistence, any AR specification for (ffr∗t−1 − ffrt−1) displays
an R̄2 less than 0.02.
2.6.2 Estimation of Identification Equation
As discussed in section 2.2 and 2.3, the demand forecast miss is used to identify the liquidity
effect. Equation (2.6) provides an additional channel for examining the relationship between
the forecast miss and target deviation, and thus the suitability of the model assumptions.
Table 2.7 displays the parameter estimates from ordinary least squares of the relationship
between deviation from target and the period t forecast error derived from the Kalman filter
procedure,
δt − Et−1δt = β(ffr∗t − ffrt), +et. (2.17)
The sample period is abridged by three weeks from the original sample. The first week is
used as a conditioning value for the state space estimation, and the next two observations
are deleted to allow for the high initial variance before practical convergence of the updating
Kalman ratio. This specification provides a robustness check of the model specification of
the maximum likelihood estimates of the Kalman filter.
The parameter estimate for β̂ is not significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
However, closer examination of the data provides a plausible explanation for this failure
to reject the hypothesis that β̂ = 0. Table 2.8 displays the dates of the 10 observations
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which exert the largest (in magnitude) inordinate influence on the parameter estimate. The
observation which corresponds to the week that financial markets reopened after the terrorist
attacks of September 2001 exerts an exceptionally large influence on the parameter estimate.







For the ith observation and jth parameter, DFBETAji equals the difference between the
parameter estimate if all observations were included, and the parameter estimate if the ith
observation were excluded from the estimation. This difference is scaled by s−i
√
cjj, the
product of the root residual mean square error calculated from the estimation which does
not include the ith observation, s−i, and the jjth, element of (X′X)−1, cjj. This influence
statistic measures the number of standard errors that the coefficient changes between the
estimation from the whole sample, and the sample which does not include the ith observation.
For the week including September 19, 2001, the ordinary least square estimate of β̂ in
(2.17), DFBETASβ,−9/11 = 3.86, which is 5.3 times larger in magnitude than the second
most influential observation. Estimates from the model without that observation changes
the point estimate for β by 3.86 times the standard error of 2.654. The sign of DFBETAS
is also meaningful, since a positive value of implies the parameter estimate without the
influence of the period following the 2001 World Trade Center attack (bj,−i from (2.18)) is
relatively low.
Table 2.9 shows the regression parameters with estimation robust to outliers. There,
the parameter estimate for β equals −7.207 and is significant at the 5% level. With con-
fidence interval (−12.8242,−1.589), β̂ is consistent with parameter estimates derived from
3For a complete discussion of this statistic see Myers (1990)
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the maximum likelihood approach.
2.6.3 Out-of-Sample Open Market Operation Prediction
The Kalman filter approach for estimating components of the structural model for the federal
funds market produces out-of-sample forecasts for the unobserved demand component δ.
These estimates imply a size of open market operation to achieve Rs∗t , the predicted level of




t + Et−1δt (2.19)




and a measure of the forecast can be made by fitting an ordinary least squares estimate
between OMO∗t and the observed change in the measure of funds supplied by open market
operation, OMOt using the relation
OMOt = a0 + a1OMO
s∗
t + et. (2.21)
Table 2.5 shows the parameter estimates for the specification of (2.21). The parameter
estimate of â1 = 0.60 implies that a $1 billion increase in permanent demand will increase
the size of the open market operation by $600 million. A 95% confidence interval for â1 =
(0.5, 0.7). Hamilton (1997) finds a relationship between the estimate of the Treasure balance
forecast miss and change in reserves equal to 0.42. The result â1 = 0.60 provides support
for the model specification and the suitability of out-of-sample forecasts as an instrument
for identification of the liquidity effect. A naive forecast of the open market operation based
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only on the previous period’s OMO, has a R2 of 23%, and a parameter estimate of −0.47
significant at the 1% level.
2.7 Conclusion
The unique structure of the federal funds market allows the behavior of the Fed to be
modeled in an adaptive expectations framework. The Trading Desk enters the market by
buying and selling bonds to equalize the funds rate with a FOMC determined target. This
structure allows for the identification of the liquidity effect of open market operations. In
a departure from the previous studies of Hamilton (1997) and Carpenter and Demiralp
(2006), this paper measures the elasticity of demand for additional reserves in terms of the
observed open market operation, not through use of supply forecast errors unavailable to
market participants. The unobserved demand component accounts for a misspecification of
the demand for funds found in previous studies which yield conspicuously small liquidity
effects.
Estimates of the liquidity effect derived from maximum likelihood estimates of a Kalman
filtering algorithm agree with the ordinary least squares estimates of the reduced form model:
an increase in open market operations of $1 billion above the average results in a decline in
the federal funds rate by about 12 basis points.
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Figure 2.1: Timeline of Information Arrival in Funds Market.
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Figure 2.2: Diagram for Identification of β.




t+1, the figure below shows the
identification scheme for the constant slope of the demand curve for federal funds D. The
period’s open market operation equals the expected demand shock. The deviation of the
funds rate from the target is linearly related to the demand shock forecast miss. The target
rate ffr ∗, the funds rate ffr, and information derived from the forecast miss Etδt+1 identify
















Table 2.1: Summary Statistics Weekly OMO.
This table shows the net OMO for weeks when a change in the target rate was announced.
Target N Mean St.Dev. Min Max
∆ffr∗ = 25bs 19 0.895 5.012 −7.786 11.036
∆ffr∗ = −25bps 6 0.671 3.629 −4.836 5.268
∆ffr∗ = 50bps 1 −2.318 . −2.318 −2.318
∆ffr∗ = −50bps 10 5.509 15.594 −11.139 46.554
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Table 2.2: Detailed OMO Statistics at Target Changes.
This table shows the size of net open market operations for weeks when the target was
changed along with the size and direction of the target adjustment.





































averages 0.895 -2.318 0.671 5.509
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Table 2.3: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Unobserved Components
Model.
This table contains maximum likelihood estimates for parameters of the model with mea-
surement equation,
Rt = Ψ
′Xt + βffrt + ηt + εt,
and transition equation
ηt = µ + ηt−1 + ξt.
The disturbance terms, ε and ξ, are assumed to be iid. Components of X are dummy vari-
ables for calendar effects. R equals the weekly average of cumulative open market operations,
ffr, the weekly transactions-weighted average federal funds rate.
The start-up value for the algorithm, δ0 the initial state equals the first observation of the
series Rt, not included in the estimation sample. The value of Σ equals 10
9. Initial values
for hyperparameter Ψ and β equal 0. The results are robust to perturbations of these initial
conditions.
The sample period includes weeks ending January 5, 2000 to the last FOMC meeting in
2007, December 19, 2007.
Variable Estimate St.Err. z-value
ffrt −8.105 1.825 0.000
Week two 1.955 0.281 0.000
December 2.311 1.123 0.040
15th of Month 2.070 0.365 0.000
Last of Month 4.138 0.418 0.000
Unscheduled Meeting 6.567 1.639 0.000
Meeting −0.990 0.443 0.025
Terror 18.194 3.267 0.000
Lag Terror 7.226 3.823 0.059
First day Q4 0.710 1.257 0.572
First day Q3 3.248 1.248 0.009
First day Q2 −0.810 1.320 0.540
First day Q1 6.046 1.575 0.000
σε 2.572 0.226 0.000
σξ 2.412 0.277 0.001
µ 0.773 0.119 0.000
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Table 2.4: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Reduced Form.
The table below displays OLS estimates for the specification
OMO∗t = µ + Ψ
′∆Xt + β(ffr
∗
t − ffr∗t−1) + λβ(ffr∗t−1 − ffrt−1) + et
Components of the dummy variables capturing calendar effects ∆X are listed by name. ffr
and ffr ∗ are weekly transactions-weighted averages of the federal funds rate and funds rate
target. The sample includes the 415 weeks ending between January 12, 2000 and the last
FOMC meeting of 2007, December 19, 2007.
R̄2 = 0.5019, N = 415
Variable Estimate St.Err. t-stat p-value
Intercept 0.78399 0.21376 3.67 0.0003
ffr∗t−1 − ffrt−1 −8.94652 3.34973 −2.67 0.0079
ffr∗t − ffr∗t−1 −9.41594 2.78338 −3.38 0.0008
2nd Week 1.97328 0.21492 9.18 <.0001
December 0.05272 1.24839 0.04 0.9663
15th 2.15419 0.31919 6.75 <.0001
Last of Month 4.06459 0.36309 11.19 <.0001
Unscheduled Meeting 8.47105 1.53409 5.52 <.0001
Meeting −0.66986 0.39292 −1.70 0.0890
Terror 11.25008 3.74799 3.00 0.0029
Lag Terror −1.61312 3.76999 −0.43 0.6690
First Day Q4 0.21825 1.16854 0.19 0.8519
First Day Q3 2.28155 1.12900 2.02 0.0440
First Day Q2 −0.29044 1.12958 −0.26 0.7972
First Day Q1 3.31435 1.32355 2.50 0.0127
Table 2.5: OLS estimates of Open Market Operation Out-of-sample Forecasts
The table below shows the ordinary least squares estimates of the relationship between
out-of-sample open market operation forecasts OMOs∗t and the observed net open market
operation in period t. The parameter estimate of â1 = 0.603 implies that for a $1 billion
increase in expected demand, the open market operation will be $600 million greater.
OMOt = a0 + a1OMO
s∗
t + et.
R̄2 = 0.253036, N = 414
Variable Estimate St.Err. t-stat p-value
Constant 0.326866 0.265119 1.232904 0.2183
OMO* 0.602955 0.050856 11.85605 <0.0001
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Table 2.6: FIML of system (2.15) and (2.16)
Full Information Maximum Likelihood estimates for the system of equations,





t−1 − λβffrt−1 + e1t (2.22)
ffrt−1 = α1ffrt−2 + e2t, (2.23)
under the assumption that the contemporaneous errors have a joint normal distribution.
R̄2 = 0.5172, N = 414, Det. Res. Covariance =0.282731
Variable Estimate St.Err. z-stat p-value
Intercept 0.429145 0.494399 0.868014 0.3854
ffr∗t − ffr∗t−1 −9.481881 3.008684 −3.151504 0.0016
ffr∗t−1 −6.999666 3.714997 −1.884165 0.0595
ffrt−1 7.103709 3.721526 1.908816 0.0563
2nd Week 1.980645 0.242255 8.175859 <0.0001
December 0.001462 1.024955 0.001426 0.9989
15th 2.177284 0.363977 5.981933 <0.0001
Last of Month 4.075480 0.389276 10.46937 <0.0001
Unscheduled Meeting 8.644554 0.911646 9.482355 <0.0001
Meeting −0.665149 0.456605 −1.456728 0.1452
Terror 11.47917 2.355908 4.872503 <0.0001
Lag Terror −1.003466 2.814909 −0.356482 0.7215
First Day Q4 0.185309 1.382168 0.134071 0.8933
First Day Q3 2.269931 1.886192 1.203447 0.2288
First Day Q2 −0.285796 1.888041 −0.151372 0.8797
First Day Q1 3.180813 0.908262 3.502089 0.0005
R̄2 = 0.9957, N = 414
ffrt−2 0.999168 0.001603 623.2681 <0.0001
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Table 2.7: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates for Forecast Error Model.
The table below displays OLS estimates for the specification
δt − Et−1δt = α + β(ffr∗t − ffrt).
The right hand side, ffrt and ffr
∗ are the transactions-weighted averages of the federal funds
rate and funds rate target. The dependent variable equals the week t unobserved demand
component forecast miss. The sample includes the 413 weeks ending between January 26,
2000, the first FOMC meeting in the study sample period, and the last FOMC meeting of
2007, December 19, 2007.
R̄2 = 0.0027, N = 413
Variable Estimate St.Err. t-stat p-value
Intercept −0.00352 0.199 −0.02 0.9859
(ffr∗ − ffr) 3.85415 2.654 1.45 0.1471
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for the ten most influential observations on the parameter estimates for the model
δt − Et−1δt = α + β(ffr∗t − ffrt) + et.
Table 2.17 shows the results from the ordinary least square estimates. DFBETA equals the
difference between the parameter estimate if all observations were included, and the param-
eter estimate if the ith observation were excluded from the estimation, scaled by s−i
√
cjj, the
product of the root residual mean square error without including the ith observation, s−i, and
the jjth, element of (X′X)−1, cjj. This influence statistic measures the number of standard
errors that the coefficient changes between the estimation from the whole sample, and the
sample which does not include the ith observation. The column β−i reports the value of β
for the model excluding that week’s observation.
Date DFBETAS Event
9/19/2001 3.7986 Week Following World Trade Center Attacks
1/3/2001 −0.718 50 basis point Target Change
8/22/2007 −0.5722 Unannounced FOMC meeting during 2007 Crisis
7/5/2000 −0.3721 Settlement Wed. Following Holiday
8/20/2003 −0.3675 Large Net OMO
9/5/2007 0.331 2007 Financial Crisis
2/2/2000 −0.2351 FOMC meeting
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Table 2.9: Robust Least Squares Estimates for Forecast Error Model.
The table below displays robust least squares estimates for the specification
δt − Et−1δt = α + β(ffr∗t − ffrt) + et
The right hand side, ffrt and ffr
∗ are the transactions-weighted averages of the federal funds
rate and funds rate target. The dependent variable equals the week t unobserved demand
component forecast miss. The sample includes the 413 weeks ending between January 26,
2000 and the last FOMC meeting of 2007, December 19, 2007.
R̄2 = 0.003, N = 413
Std. 95%
Parameter Estimate Error Confidence Limits χ2 Pr > χ2
Intercept −0.1137 0.1799 −0.4662 0.2388 0.40 0.5273





Federal funds rate target changes are considered significant indicators of the stance of mon-
etary policy. A substantial literature examines the impact of monetary policy on financial
markets and the real economy, and how monetary policy might react to external economic
forces. This chapter presents a measure of demand pressure exerted on the federal funds
rate target. Estimates from a structural model derived from the Federal Reserve’s mandate
to maintain the overnight borrowing rate between depository institutions around a target
provide the metric, based on the relationship between realized deviations of the federal funds
rate from target and reserves supplied through open market operations.
The Trading Desk (the Desk) at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York conducts open
market operations to in an effort to equalize the supply and demand for reserves at a target
rate. If demand for funds increases, an open market purchase may only satisfy the increased
demand, and will not necessarily lower the funds rate. Furthermore, failure of the Desk to
sanitize the effect of the additional demand will result in a higher equilibrium rate without
directly reducing the supply of reserves through open market operations. This chapter
develops a metric of the extent the market for federal funds is influenced by demand pressure
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from market participants. Movement to a higher target rate, occurring in the direction of
market pressure, may not necessarily be a clear demonstration of activist monetary tightening
as that made in the presence of increased demand for federal funds. Utilization of the
unobserved state variables from maximum likelihood estimates from the Kalman filter model
developed in Section 2.3 allows for a characterization of this demand pressure.
Section 3.3 describes the measure of demand pressure metric building on the model
developed in Section 2.3. Sections 3.5 and 3.5.1 describe results testing the hypothesis of
Section 3.4. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Background
Thornton (2004) formalizes the distinctions between three alternative views regarding the
Fed’s management of the funds rate target. Of those, the “open market” and “open mouth”
hypothesis require the Fed to inject funds to achieve a lower rate, and remove them to increase
the realized rate. While the open market view requires movements in the short-term rate
to be synchronous with adjustments in reserve balances, the open mouth hypothesis asserts
that the Fed can achieve the new target simply by announcing the target change. Although,
as discussed by Taylor (2001), even with open mouth effects, open market operations must
eventually be conducted to realize a target change.
The third possibility exists, dubbed “interest rate smoothing,” whereby the Fed acts to
smooth transitions between target levels determined by movements in the market-equilibrium
short-term rate. For example, under the open market hypothesis, an increase in the federal
funds rate target is achieved through a tightening of the supply of credit. Alternatively, if an
increase in the target rate is a response to demand pressure at the current rate, forcing the
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Fed to supply an inordinate quantity of reserves to maintain the target, the target change
is a response to other real factors, and not necessarily a new policy stance. Distinguishing
between the open mouth and interest rate smoothing hypothesis is more complicated than
simply determining the correlation between open market operations and the funds rate. For
example, the announcement of, and the market trading at a lower federal funds rate target,
not accompanied contemporaneously by open market purchases, might be interpreted as a
policy change implemented by way of the open mouth hypothesis. However, as discussed by
Thornton (2004), if the underlying market rate had already adjusted, and was only being
restrained artificially by decreasing the rate of open market purchases, the change to the
new lower rate may even be accompanied by further reductions in the rate of open market
purchases, to keep the rate from falling even lower. The interest rate smoothing hypothesis
provides a channel by which the Fed could engage in activist policy without changing the
nominal interest rate target. For example, an increase in demand for federal funds would
require relatively larger open market operations to maintain the target rate, action typically
associated with loosening monetary policy.
In broad terms, the extant literature addressing interest rate smoothing can be separated
into two categories. One considers the phenomenon at longer-term, quarterly frequency, the
other at monthly or higher frequency. At the lower frequency, adjustments to the interest
rate target can be viewed in terms of the response to factors such as unemployment, prices,
and the output gap.1
Guthrie and Wright (2004, 2002) provide a theoretical framework for the decision to
1Theoretical and empirical studies of the low-frequency smoothing and inertial qualities of the target rate
include: McCallum (1981), Mankiw (1987), Woodford (1999) Sack and Wieland (2000), Hamilton and Jordá
(2002), Rudebusch (2002), and Florio (2006) among others.
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address the questions of how and when a central bank will change its short-run interest rate
target at the higher frequency. They propose a model where the monetary authority targets a
particular rate, and the preferred value of the interest rate follows a Brownian motion process.
The market rate managed by the policymaker deviates with a zero mean error about the
target, due to liquidity shocks which are outside of the central bank’s control. The target
rate deviates from the preferred rate following a Wiener process, and these deviations are
modeled to be costly according to a quadratic loss of the deviation. Incorporating costs for
the two types for target changes; fixed and proportional to the size of the change, the authors
show their model’s consistency with many observed behavior of target rate changes.
The approach discussed in Section 3.3 addresses the Fed’s interest rate target using a
similar argument, but with a question of interest framed somewhat differently. Here, the
object is to quantify the amount of pressure being exerted on the target rate, and in that
way to characterize policy in the presence or absence of target changes. In the framework
provided by Guthrie and Wright, a market rate, (here, the funds rate) is effectively controlled
at the target and the market rate. The interest rate smoothing hypothesis, as framed here,
suggests that the market rate may, at times, be driven by forces outside of the Fed’s control,
and therefore is not managed to be equal to the target without cost, even when the objective
is achieved.
Thornton (2004) proposes that because of what he calls policy endogeneity, the liquidity
effect can only be identified if, in response to a shock in the real interest rate, policymakers
adjust the nominal interest rate by an amount greater than is needed to keep the rate
unchanged. This would only be the case if they did so precisely, as the deviation from the
nominal target rate does provide information about the market demand for reserves and
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the amount by which the Fed’s open market operations are failing to placate demand at
the target rate. It is this observation which is utilized to identify the liquidity effect and,
additionally, to measure the amount of market pressure exerted on the rate.
3.3 Properties of Demand Pressure
The issues discussed by Thornton (2004) and those summarized by Figure 3.1 demonstrate
that funds rate movements may not be accompanied by open market operations in the
opposite direction. If, for example, the demand for funds falls, the Fed would be inclined to
drain (or provide fewer) reserves simply to maintain the target. A similar argument holds at
the time of target changes. The Fed may choose inaction or to slow the rate of open market
purchases in order to move the equilibrium rate higher.
Since 1994 the procedure of the FOMC has typically been to announce target changes at
the time of scheduled FOMC meetings. Of the 36 federal funds rate target changes occurring
in the period under study2 only four were announced after unscheduled FOMC meetings.
The announcement of a new or unchanged policy rate has been accompanied by a description
of the policy stance, and decisions which will be made at the next meeting depend on the
events that occur in the intervening period.
Rudebusch (2002) notes a New York Times article (July, 26, 2000) where FOMC Chair-
man Greenspan reports the FOMC’s “. . . decision about whether to raise interest rates again
at its meeting next month would hinge in large part on economic data released in coming
weeks.” Rudebusch concludes, that after the FOMC announcement, “there was little if any
pent-up pressure from the past for further adjustment.” The suggestion that market expec-
2Data for the study is derived from Federal Reserve Bank of New York data on open market operations
between July 2000 and December 2007. Operations data is unavailable before this period.
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tations and behavior are adjusted by the announcements made at FOMC meetings, and that
the Desk evaluates the funds rate market at a fairly high frequency, inform the specification
of the model below.3
Let the demand for federal funds equal Rdt , The weekly demand for funds R
d
t depend
linearly on the federal funds rate, ffr, a stochastic demand component, δ, and a vector of
known, seasonal or calendar factors influencing the level of demand, X.
Rdt = Ψ
′Xt + βffrt + δt. (3.1)
The demand shock δ segments the disturbance to demand into two components. One por-
tion, ε, manifests as idiosyncratic noise; the other, η, evolves following a random walk with
constant drift.
δt = ηt + εt, εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε) (3.2a)
ηt = µ + ηt−1 + ξt, ξt ∼ N(0, σ2ξ ). (3.2b)
Let Rs
∗
t equal the level of funds that the Fed would supply in each period t if the demand






t + δt. (3.3)






t + Et−1δt. (3.4)
Let the L FOMC meetings during the period under study occur in periods tl, where l ∈
{1..L}. Let the number of weeks between meeting l and l + 1 equal kl. For example, if the
3Further examples of the high-frequency determination of open market operations can be found in Feinman
(1993) and Thornton (2007) among others.
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first FOMC meeting occurs in period t1, their next meeting occurs in period t2 = t1 + kl +1.
The cumulative sum of the forecast errors for reserves required to maintain the target between
FOMC meetings equals the unexpected change in demand between periods tl and tl + kl.
Figure 3.2 summarizes the notation and the demand metric. A positive accumulation of
estimation errors implies that the additional funds supplied through open market operations
are less than those required to maintain the target rate. Given, that for all n, the stochastic
demand component in period t + n equals,
δt+n = ηt+n + εt+n (3.5)
= µ + ηt+n−1 + ξt+n + εt+n (3.6)
= 2µ + ηt+n−2 + ξt+n + ξt+n−1 + εt+n (3.7)
...
= nµ + ηt +
n∑
j=1
ξt+n−j + ξt+n + εt+n. (3.8)
Expectations of δt+n formed in period t + n − 1 equal:
Et+n−1δt+n = nµ + ηt +
n∑
j=1
ξt+n−j + Et+n−1ξt+n + Et+n−1εt+n (3.9)




The amount of pressure exerted on the funds rate target between FOMC meetings, the
















(δtl+i − Etl+i−1δtl+i). (3.11)
The difference between Equations (3.8) and (3.10) give
δt+n − Et+n−1δt+n = nµ + ηt +
n−1∑
j=0




= ξt+n + εt+n, ∀n ∈ N+. (3.13)
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Thus, the right hand side of (3.11) can be written as:
kl∑
i=0
(δtl+i − Etl+i−1δtl+i) =
kl∑
i=0
(ξtl+i + εtl+i). (3.14)
Since tl+1 = tl+kl+1, define Ωl+k, the demand pressure variable for each week in the sample,




(ξtl+i + εtl+i), (3.15)
where k = {1..kl} for each value of l. The lower frame of Figure 3.2 shows a timeline of the




(ξtl+i + εtl+i), (3.16)
gives the value for the pressure metric in the week before an FOMC meeting.
3.4 Hypothesis
The interest rate smoothing hypothesis, as stated by Thornton (2004) asserts that, “the
Fed does not move rates per se, but rather changes its target for the nominal interest rate
in response to economic shocks.” Measuring the pressure on the funds rate to trade away
from its target provides a quantitative estimate for the policy endogeneity of new target
rates. Since, in general, activist policy need not manifest through changing the market rate,
changes in line with market pressure on the target would provide support that the target
change is endogenous, and moving against or without market pressure supports that the
change is exogenous. Within this framework, the implementation and effects of policy may
be examined in the light of activist or policy-driven target changes versus those which are
the result of the Fed relenting to other market pressures.
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Hypothesis 1: Accumulated upward pressure on the target rate between FOMC
meetings is associated with larger open market operations










represents the hypothesis that lower accumulated pressure reduces the need for additional
funds to be supplied to reduce the market interest rate. In each period, the Desk bases
its decision on the forecast of demand pressure and the mandate from the FOMC. Higher
unsatisfied demand for additional funds supplied by OMOs is measured by the cumulative
demand pressure metric. Larger open market operations correspond to periods following,
and coinciding with, periods of increased demand pressure. Hypothesis 1 tests if periods
when pressure is high (or has been increasing), correspond with periods of high open market
operations.
The tendency for target changes to occur in the direction of the measure of accumulated
demand provides support of the interest rate smoothing hypothesis. The pressure metric
Ω need not perform as a predictive explanatory variable for target changes. The Fed may
decide to change the target rate in an opposite direction than that predicted by the direction
of pressure on the rate. However, the comovement of the backwards-looking pressure metric
and the FOMC target change decisions can be estimated using an ordered discrete choice
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model to find the marginal effects of higher accumulated demand pressure as of FOMC
meetings or decisions.
Hypothesis 2: Accumulated upward pressure a the time of FOMC meetings
increases the likelihood of increases in the target rate.
During the sample period, target changes are announced as discrete incremental changes,
and thus models for ordered discrete choice are well suited to the examination of the rela-
tionship between the accumulated pressure and the future decisions on the funds rate target.
The marginal effects derived from ordered probit models test the hypothesis that a higher
demand pressure metric increases the likelihood of a change to a higher target rate. This
hypothesis can be expressed as
∂ Pr(∆ffr∗ < 0|Ωl+kl)
∂Ωl+kl
< 0 (3.19)
∂ Pr(∆ffr∗ > 0|Ωl+kl)
∂Ωl+kl
> 0, (3.20)
the probability of a target change conditioned upon the value of Ωl+kl. Higher (lower) the
accumulated demand manifests as upward (downward) pressure on the rate. To relieve this
pressure the fed may be inclined to adjust the target.
3.5 Results from Tests of Pressure on the Target Rate
Hypothesis 1 addresses the relationship between the size of open market operations needed
to affect the target rate in terms of the accumulation of pressure on the federal funds rate.
An alternative statement of hypothesis 1 is that open market operations are larger during
periods when the accumulated pressure on the target is positive, and lower when negative.
Constructing a dummy variable Dt = {0, 1} for the state of the pressure metric, and find-
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ing the relationship between average open market operations in either regime provides a
straightforward test. Table 3.2 shows the results for the model




0, Ωt ≤ 0,
1, Ωt > 0.
(3.22)
The parameter estimate â equals the mean of open market operations when the pressure
is positive, and b̂, when pressure is negative. The statistically significant at the 5% level
parameter estimate b̂ = 2.013 suggests that the mean open market operation is higher when
pressure is high, and a Wald statistic 15.858 ∼ χ21 rejects the null hypothesis that â = b̂, the
subsample means equal 2.013, during positive pressure periods, and −0.35 during negative
pressure periods, are not equal. This result is in favor of hypothesis 1, that the size of open
market operations are positively related to the metric of demand pressure accumulation.
A less general specification of the hypothesis is written as
∆Rt = α0 + α1Ωt + α2Ω
2
t · (sign(Ωt)). (3.23)
The dependent variable equals the week-t change in Rt the total of all open market operations
in that period. The explanatory variable, Ωt equals the accumulated pressure since the last
FOMC meeting, and Ω2t sign(Ωt) is the square of the accumulated pressure, multiplied the
sign of Ωt in that period.
sign(Ωt) =
{
−1, Ωt ≤ 0
1, Ωt > 0.
(3.24)
The quadratic term attempts to capture the possible of non-linear relationships while ac-
counting for the direction of the pressure.
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Ordinary least square estimates for parameters (3.23) finds the relationship between
the accumulated pressure on the target and the open market operations in that period.
The estimates fail to reject the hypothesis of a positive correlation between accumulating
demand pressure and open market operations with a positive point estimate for α1. Table
3.3 displays results from this specification. The statistically significant parameter estimate
α̂ = 0.2679 implies that an additional $1 billion in demand pressure, the Fed will supply
approximately $270 million in additional reserves via open market operations. The quadratic
term is insignificant at the 5% level.
3.5.1 FOMC Meetings and Demand Pressure
Most target adjustments occur at the time of scheduled FOMC meetings. In the period
between 2000 and 2008, four target changes occur at unscheduled meetings: two 50-basis-
point reductions in 2001, on January 3 and April 18, one 50-basis-point reduction after
the attacks on the World Trade Center in September of 2001, and the other just five days
before a scheduled meeting in December of 2007. Table 3.1 displays the dates of the 68
FOMC meetings4 ordered in terms of the accumulated demand pressure Ωl+kl the value of
the pressure metric during the week before the FOMC meeting, along with the direction and
size of the target change. Of meetings ranked the highest positive quartile for the pressure
metric, seven of 11 target changes are to higher rates, four to lower rates. The 17 meetings
occurring in lowest value quartile, six occur with changes to a lower target announced and
two to a higher rate. Figure 3.3 shows a scatter plot of target changes against the value of
the preceding week’s pressure metric. The average value for Ωl+kl at FOMC meetings with
4The first meeting of the sample on 2/2/2000 not included due to incomplete data from the period between
the previous meeting.
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positive changes equals 3.8659 with a standard error of 2.11. For changes down, average
Ωl+kl equals −2.166 with standard error of 2.30.
The relationship between the pressure metric and subsequent target changes at an FOMC
meeting can be investigated following the approach of Estrella and Mishkin (1998), Estrella
and Hardouvelis (1991), and in particular Hausman et al. (1992). Work of Estrella, Mishkin
and Hardouvelis examines measures of the term structure to inform the likelihood of a
recession being declared in upcoming quarters. Hausman et al. (1992) employ an ordered
probit model to estimate forecasts of (then) discrete tick-by-tick changes of NYSE equity
prices.
3.5.2 General Specification
Hausman et al. (1992) use an ordered probit model to study discrete changes in stock prices.
This section describes the method and application to the funds rate target. Equation (3.25)
describes the latent regression model
P ∗t = w
′
tγ + εt, (3.25)
with P ∗, an unobserved continuous random variable, conditioned upon the vector w. The
















where, Ajk partitions the state-space S
∗ of P ∗ where S∗ =
⋃m
j=1 Aj , and Ai
⋂
Aj = ∅, for
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i 	= j, with
A1 ≡ (−∞, α1] (3.27)
A2 ≡ (α1, α2] (3.28)
Ai ≡ (αi−1, αi] (3.29)
...
Am ≡ (αm−1,∞), (3.30)
where the boundaries αk depend on w.
The conditional distribution of target changes conditioned on the regressors w are deter-
mined by the partition boundaries:
Pr(P ∗t = sj|wt) = Pr(P ∗t ∈ Ajk) = Pr(w′tγ + εt ∈ Ajk|w′t) (3.31)
=

Φ(α1 −w′tγ), i = 1
Φ(αi − w′tγ) − Φ(αi−1 − w′tγ), 1 < i < m
1 − Φ(αm−1 −w′tγ), i = m.
(3.32)
where Φ() is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Let Vit equal one for















Φ(αk −wt′γ) − Φ(αk−1 −wt′γ)
)
+ Vmt · log
(




provides the parametric estimates for αk and γ conditional on the explanatory variable w.
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3.5.3 Specification and Results
Let Pt = sj ∈ {−1, 0, 1} where values of sj correspond to the target being lowered, held
constant, or increased at an FOMC meeting, and wtγ = Ωl+klγ. Table 3.4 displays maximum
likelihood estimates of model parameters relating demand pressure one week before FOMC
meetings to subsequent target changes. The parameter estimate for the pressure metric
Ωl+kl are positive and significant at the 5% level, although magnitude and sign are not
interpretable in this context. The lower frames of Table 3.4 show the marginal effects of a
change in Ωl+kl evaluated at the mean of −0.212. These marginal effects equal
∂ Pr(Pt = −1|Ωl+kl)
∂Ωl+kl
= −φ(α1 − Ωl+klγ)γ (3.34)




φ(α1 − Ωl+klγ) − φ(α2 − Ωl+klγ)
]
γ (3.35)
∂ Pr(Pt = 1|Ωl+kl)
∂Ωl+kl
= φ(α2 − Ωl+klγ)γ. (3.36)
The sign and significance of the marginal effects on the probability of increasing or decreasing
the target rate fail to reject hypothesis 2. At the average value of Ωl+kl, the marginal effect
of a one-unit increase in the pressure metric has a significant, positive effect, increasing the
probability of a positive change in the target rate by 1.06 percent.
Lines drawn in Figure 3.4 graph the probability of target changes predicted by the model
by pressure metric Ωl+kl . On each of the curves, symbols show individual FOMC meetings
for each of the three possible outcomes. For example, diamonds drawn on the curve showing
the probability of an increase in the target rate represent values of Ωl+kl when the target
was increased. The crosses on the curve showing the probability of lower rates mark FOMC
meetings when the target is adjusted lower.
Figure 3.5 shows marginal effects of a one-unit change in the pressure metric across levels
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of Ωl+kl. The estimated increase in probability that the FOMC will lower the target rate
when the one-unit increase in Ωl+kl probability to a lower target equals 1%. Higher values
of Ωl+kl increase the probability of a change to a higher rate at all levels, and exceed the
increase in likelihood of no change.
This result supports the hypothesis that the pressure as measured by the accumulation
of unanticipated demand shocks between FOMC meetings is related to subsequent target
changes. The metric Ωl+kl measures the accumulated forecast miss of expected demand
for additional base money, and the relationship between this metric and subsequent target
changes demonstrates the correlation of the accumulation of unanticipated shifts in demand
with subsequent changes in the target rate.
3.6 Limitations
Pressure on the federal funds rate target may be the result of anticipated changes in the
target rate. For example, an anticipated increase in the target may increase present demand.
However, Ωl+kl is defined as the cumulative sum of demand forecast errors in the week before
FOMC meetings, and potential arbitrage opportunities are limited by the short-term nature
of the federal funds transactions.
The ordered choice procedure does not produce forecasts of future target changes, but
relates a measure of unsatisfied demand for funds to target changes. High values for the
pressure metric suggest increased demand for federal funds. The results imply a relationship
exists between demand for funds and subsequent target changes. The federal funds futures
contracts provide a market-derived value for the probability of a change in the target rate,
and while these implied probabilities measure markets expectations of an FOMC decision,
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they similarly cannot determine the directional relationship between pressure being exerted
on the funds rate market and policy. A direction for future research is to examine the causal
relationship between policy and demand pressure, including implications and relationships
between anticipated target changes and demand pressure on the target rate.
3.7 Conclusion
Market pressure exerted on the target rate measured by the accumulated forecast miss of
the Desk to achieve the target is correlated with subsequent target change decisions in the
direction predicted by the model. Higher pressure in the weeks preceding the FOMC meeting
increases the probability of a change in the target to a higher rate, and higher pressure on
the target rate is accompanied by larger net open market operations. This result provides
support in favor of the interest rate smoothing hypothesis, and that the assumption of
exogenous funds rate target changes may not always be appropriate.
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Figure 3.1: Diagram Showing Net Negative OMO to Maintain Target.
This figure shows how an OMO at the beginning of period t + 1 with a net negative impact,










Figure 3.2: Weekly Open Market Operations and Demand Pressure.
This figure shows the timing of the accumulation of demand pressure on the federal funds
rate target. The difference δt−Et−1δt equals the periodic component of unexpected demand.
Between two FOMC meetings which occur at time t and t+kl, each period’s demand forecast
miss sums to a measure of the level of pressure relevant at the lth meeting, the amount of
pressure accumulated between t and t + kl − 1.
δtl+1 − Etlδtl+1
. . .tl + 1
FOMC Meeting l
tl tl+1tl + kl
δtl − Etl−1δtl
FOMC Meeting l + 1





where k = {1..kl} for each value of l.
The timing in terms of Ωl+k,
Ω(l+1)+0
. . .
. . .tl + 1
FOMC Meeting l
tl tl+1tl + kl
FOMC Meeting l + 1
Ωl+0 Ωl+1 Ωl+2 Ωl+kl
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Table 3.1: FOMC Meetings Sorted by Accumulated Pressure on the Target Rate
The table below shows the measure of inter-FOMC period pressure, Ω, as of the period before
the FOMC meeting, the last day of the week the FOMC meeting occurs, and the announced
change in the target rate, if any. The table is ordered by size of the pressure metric, from low
to high. Dates marked with asterisks for weeks including unscheduled meetings of the FOMC.
FOMC Meeting Ω Target Change FOMC Meeting Ω Target Change
7/4/2007 −27.69656072 . 7/5/2006 0.08305454 0.25
8/13/2003 −17.8858496 . 10/25/2006 0.25552607 .
11/7/2001 −14.45208478 −0.5 7/6/2005 0.30395736 0.25
12/12/2001 −14.23031143 −0.25 2/1/2006 0.65155743 0.25
1/31/2001 −13.8673797 −0.5 6/27/2001 1.26859924 −0.25
3/17/2004 −12.29148691 . 5/8/2002 1.33114837 .
11/6/2002 −10.76504889 −0.5 12/11/2002 1.40583522 .
5/10/2006 −10.67685224 0.25 8/23/2000 1.73772135 .
11/2/2005 −9.63227977 0.25 8/22/2007∗ 2.05493661 .
3/21/2001 −9.01155476 −0.5 5/9/2007 2.32853421 .
3/20/2002 −7.92849656 . 12/10/2003 2.82226154 .
6/25/2003 −7.57241829 −0.25 5/17/2000 3.77767698 0.5
9/20/2006 −7.45221586 . 9/17/2003 4.05281133 .
10/29/2003 −7.24407483 . 5/5/2004 4.55340794 .
8/14/2002 −6.53722243 . 8/9/2006 5.18603815 .
3/19/2003 −5.48943037 . 9/21/2005 5.39157431 0.25
1/31/2007∗ −5.36338312 . 8/10/2005 5.57121628 0.25
9/19/2001 −5.16360758 −0.5 6/26/2002 5.79975596 .
1/28/2004 −5.08143766 . 9/19/2007∗ 5.81438558 −0.5
8/8/2007 −4.9633373 . 5/7/2003 6.94293336 .
9/25/2002 −4.84789234 . 8/22/2001 8.05299907 −0.25
2/2/2005 −4.8374898 0.25 10/4/2000 9.78622802 .
6/28/2000 −3.86574951 . 3/21/2007 10.71673603 .
3/23/2005 −3.75264231 0.25 1/3/2001 11.08608383 −0.5
1/30/2002 −2.33947941 . 12/20/2000 11.19765056 .
5/16/2001 −1.81160545 −0.5 12/13/2006 12.09295775 .
4/18/2001∗ −1.65581229 −0.5 3/29/2006 12.76180575 0.25
10/31/2007 −1.59224534 −0.25 12/15/2004 14.7614316 0.25
11/10/2004 −1.55364739 0.25 12/14/2005 15.99713624 0.25
6/30/2004 −1.47732876 0.25 9/22/2004 16.7576113 0.25
8/15/2007 −1.35086927 . 10/3/2001 19.88234022 −0.5






Table 3.2: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates Binary Pressure Specification
Model.
The table below displays OLS estimates for the specification
∆Rt = aDt + b(1 − Dt).
The right hand side, the binary variable equals 1 when Ωt, the accumulated pressure since
the FOMC meeting is positive, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable equals the week
t change in Rt the sum of average open market operations. The sample includes the 413
weeks ending between January 26, 2000, the first FOMC meeting in the study sample period,
and the last FOMC meeting of 2007, December 19, 2007.
R̄2 = 0.0347, N = 413
Variable Estimate St.Err. t-stat p-value
Dt 2.013725 0.421452 4.778063 0.0000
(1 − Dt) −0.354072 0.419421 -0.844193 0.3991
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Table 3.3: Least Squares Estimates for Nonlinear Pressure Specification Model.
The table below displays OLS estimates for the specification
∆Rt = γ0 + γ1Ωt + γ2Ω
2
t sign(Ωt)
The dependent variable equals the week-t change in Rt the total of all open market operations
in that period. The explanatory variable, Ωt equals the accumulated pressure since the last
FOMC meeting, and Ω2t sign(Ωt) equals the square of the accumulated pressure, multiplied
the sign of Ωt in that period.
sign(Ωt) =
{
−1, Ωt ≤ 0
1, Ωt > 0
(3.37)
The sample includes the 413 weeks ending between January 26, 2000, the first FOMC
meeting in the study sample period, and the last FOMC meeting of 2007, December 19, 2007.
R̄2 = 0.0401, N = 413
Variable Estimate St.Err. t-stat p-value
C 0.844014 0.298362 2.828827 0.0049
Ω 0.267964 0.073703 3.635726 0.0003
Ω2sign(Ω) −0.006992 0.003637 −1.922516 0.0552
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Figure 3.3: Scatter Plot of Pressure Metric Ω and Target Changes.
The horizontal axis shows the target changes in basis points. The vertical axis, the value
of Ωl+kl , the value of the metric for accumulated pressure on the target rate as of the week
preceding each of the 68 FOMC meetings between 3/22/2000 and 12/31/2007.
To illustrate the relationship between this and Table 3.1 the end of week date is displayed
near the largest magnitude observations of Ω in each class.





















Table 3.4: Ordered Probit Model. Dependent Variable Equals {-1,0,1}
The dependent variable corresponds to FOMC meetings where lower (−1), unchanged (0),
and higher (1) target changes are announced. The explanatory variable Ωt equals the accu-
mulated demand pressure as of the week prior to the period including the FOMC meeting.
Marginal effects are calculated at the sample average of Ωl+kl= −0.0212
Pr(P ∗t = sj|Ωl+kl) = Pr(P ∗t ∈ Ajk) = Pr(Ωl+klγ + εt ∈ Ajk|Ωl+kl) (3.38)
Pr(P ∗t = sj|Ωl+kl) =

Φ(α1 − Ωl+klγ), i = 1
Φ(αi − Ωl+klγ) − Φ(αi−1 − Ωl+klγ), 1 < i < m
1 − Φ(αm−1 − Ωl+klγ), i = m.
(3.39)
∂ Pr(Pt = −1|Ωl+kl)
∂Ωl+kl
= −φ(α1 − Ωl+klγ)γ (3.40)




φ(α1 − Ωl+klγ) − φ(α2 − Ωl+klγ)
]
γ (3.41)
∂ Pr(Pt = 1|Ωl+kl)
∂Ωl+kl
= φ(α2 − Ωl+klγ)γ. (3.42)
Pseudo R2 = 0.0314, N = 68
Variable Estimate St.Err. z-stat P > z ←95%C.I.→
(Threshold)
Ωl+kl 0.0318119 0.0152386 2.09 0.037 0.0019449 0.061679
α1 −0.7515942 0.1701431 . . −1.085068 −0.4181199
α2 0.6064166 0.1653387 . . 0.2823588 0.9304744
Marginal effects calculated at the sample average of Ωl+kl= −0.0212
Pr(∆ffr∗ < 0) = 0.22564
Variable Estimate St.Err. z-stat P > z ←95%C.I.→
Ωl+kl −0.0095561 0.00462 -2.07 0.039 -0.018608 -0.000504
Pr(∆ffr∗ = 0) = 0.50168
Variable Estimate St.Err. z-stat P > z ←95%C.I.→
Ωl+kl -0.0010143 0.00193 -0.53 0.599 -0.0048 .002771
Pr(∆ffr∗ > 0) = 0.27268
Variable Estimate St.Err. z-stat P > z ←95%C.I.→
Ωl+kl 0.0105704 0.00511 2.07 0.039 0.000554 0.020587
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Figure 3.4: Ordered Probit Model. Dependent Variable Equals {-1,0,1}
The figure below shows the estimated probability of announcements of target rate changes
at FOMC meetings.
Pr(ffr∗tl < 0|Ωl+kl) = Φ(α1 − Ωl+klγ) (3.43)
Pr(ffr∗tl = 0|Ωl+kl) = Φ(αi − Ωl+klγ) − Φ(αi−1 − Ωl+klγ), (3.44)
Pr(ffr∗tl > 0|Ωl+kl) = 1 − Φ(αm−1 − Ωl+klγ). (3.45)
Lines graph the probability of target changes predicted by the model by pressure metric
Ωl+kl. On each of the curves, symbols show individual FOMC meetings for each of the three
possible outcomes. For example, diamonds drawn on the curve showing the probability of
an increase in the target rate represent values of Ωl+kl when the target was increased. The
crosses on the curve showing the probability of lower rates mark FOMC meetings when the
target is adjusted lower.
Pseudo R2 = 0.0314, N = 68
Variable Estimate St.Err. z-stat P > z ←95%C.I.→
(Threshold)
Ωl+kl 0.0318119 0.0152386 2.09 0.037 0.0019449 0.061679
α1 −0.7515942 0.1701431 . . −1.085068 −0.4181199
α2 0.6064166 0.1653387 . . 0.2823588 0.9304744





















Pr(∆ ffr* <0) 
∆ ffr*<0 
Pr(∆ ffr* =0) 
∆ ffr*=0 
Pr(∆ ffr* >0) 
∆ ffr*>0 
56
Figure 3.5: Marginal Effects of Ordered Probit Model.
The figure below shows marginal effects of a change in the pressure metric at each level of
Ωl+kl.
∂ Pr(∆ffr∗ < 0|Ωl+kl)
∂Ωl+kl
= −φ(α1 − Ωl+klγ)γ (3.46)




φ(α1 − Ωl+klγ) − φ(α2 − Ωl+klγ)
]
γ (3.47)
∂ Pr(∆ffr∗ > 0|Ωl+kl)
∂Ωl+kl
= φ(α2 − Ωl+klγ)γ. (3.48)
Marginal effects calculated at the sample average of Ωl+kl= −0.0212
Pr(∆ffr∗ < 0) = 0.22564
Variable Estimate St.Err. z-stat P > z ←95%C.I.→
Ωl+kl −0.0095561 0.00462 -2.07 0.039 -0.018608 -0.000504
Pr(∆ffr∗ = 0) = 0.50168
Variable Estimate St.Err. z-stat P > z ←95%C.I.→
Ωl+kl -0.0010143 0.00193 -0.53 0.599 -0.0048 .002771
Pr(∆ffr∗ > 0) = 0.27268
Variable Estimate St.Err. z-stat P > z ←95%C.I.→
Ωl+kl 0.0105704 0.00511 2.07 0.039 0.000554 0.020587
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The Impact of U.S. Treasury Auctions
on Discount Yields
4.1 Introduction
The discount function is an integral component in the study of financial market phenom-
ena. Default-free zero-coupon rates, derived from prices of U.S. Treasury securities, deliver
benchmark yields of uniform risk across the term structure. The Treasury’s debt management
policy, informing the size and maturity of treasury auctions, must balance the government’s
objective to finance spending at the lowest cost, while satisfying market participant’s de-
mand for risk-free securities. Auctions increase the nominal supply of interest and principal
cashflows to be paid on the federal debt, and at the auctioned issue’s maturity horizon, this
increase in cashflows is most significant.
This paper examines discount yields constructed from off-the-run bond prices. Since
prices of newly issued, on-the-run bonds are not included in the determination of the discount
yields, the effect of auction events can be related directly to the absorption effect. The effect
of a change in the supply of cashflows on these discount rates are not directly related to
changes in liquidity of the underlying assets, since the yields are constructed using twice off-
the-run bond prices. An event study approach finds a positive relationship between auction
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events and the change in relative yields at one, two, three, four, and seven-year horizons.
While short-lived, the effect on relative yields at the horizons of auction events is positive
and independent of the size of the auction. The auction event transmits no new information
regarding size, since announcements occurring days or weeks before the auction report an
anticipated subscription amount. By comparison, event study results using a set of yields
constructed primarily from the on-the-run issues display a more persistent liquidity-premium
effect at the five, ten, and thirty-year horizons.
Since 1982, the announcement and auction of U.S. Treasury debt with maturity one year
and greater occurs on a fairly regular schedule. Garbade (2007) cites reduction of market
uncertainty and lower borrowing costs among the reasons for Treasury’s abandonment of
irregular, or tactical debt issuance. Auctions of additional default-free cashflows can be
associated with two distinct effects: (1) A “liquidity-premium effect” due to the fact that
new issues are more liquid thus requiring a lower return; and (2) An “absorption effect”
associated with the additional supplies of cashflows inducing lower prices.
Goldreich et al. (2005) find the premium for off-the-run over on-the-run 2-year notes
to be approximately 1.5 basis points at the issue date of a new security, declining as the
on-the-run bonds transition to the first off-the-run status. Warga (1992) studies bonds with
maturity greater than one year, finding constant duration portfolios composed of on-the-run
issues earn a premium of 55 basis points per year over a similarly constructed portfolio of
off-the-run bonds.
An absorption effect occurs through the market segmentation channel. Downward sloping
demand curves for bonds of a particular maturity require lower prices with higher supplies.
Seligman (2006) and Simon (1991, 1994) examine unscheduled auctions of short-term cash-
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management bills and provide evidence of this effect at the short end of the term structure.
By examining the yield differentials relative to neighboring maturity instruments over auc-
tion events, Seligman finds that the positive price effect of increased liquidity is dominated by
other factors at the short end of the yield curve. The size of the yield differential for cash-
management bills equals 31.24 basis points between the auction and announcement date.
Simon (1991) finds a 20 basis point average change in the spread between cash-management
and adjacent-maturity bill rates. These large differences can be attributed in part to the
nature of cash management bills, typically unscheduled, very short-term operations. In con-
trast to these results from the short-term yield curve, this study characterizes the impact of
auction events at longer-term horizons using zero-coupon yields of Gürkaynak et al. (2007).
These yields, constructed prices for bonds at least twice off-the-run, provide daily data on
zero-coupon rates for maturities of one through 30 years at annual increments. Gürkay-
nak et al. (2007) argue that the use of off-the-run bonds in construction of discount yields
sidesteps the problematic liquidity-premium implications encountered in other yield data,
including the Treasury’s constant-maturity series. The newly issued instruments are ex-
cluded from the sample of treasuries used to estimate the yields for an appropriate risk-free
zero-coupon discount function.
The following section describes the background and testable hypothesis. Sections 4.2.1
and 4.3 describe the data and empirical method of the study, Section 4.5 presents results.
Section 4.6 describes extensions to the model and Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Background and Hypothesis
Scholes (1972) presents the theoretical motivation for the negative price effect of a firm mak-
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ing additional shares available. If securities have close substitutes, an increase in the supply
of additional shares will have no price effect, since those new shares will be sold at the mar-
ket price for similar income streams. If a firm’s shares do not have close substitutes in the
market, then the cashflows cannot be matched well with other assets, and the demand elas-
ticity for a stock will determine lower prices when supply increases. An implied alternative
possibility is that changes in the supply of equity shares, affected, for example, by secondary
distributions or large block trades of institutional investors, are related to other information
such as the firm’s fundamental value. Asquith and Mullins (1986) find prices adjust quickly
and negatively to information of seasoned equity offerings in support of Scholes’ price pres-
sure hypothesis. Fama et al. (1969) find stock splits serve as events which trigger repricing
of expected income streams shortly after the split announcement. Holthausen et al. (1987)
examine block trades, finding a distinction between buyer and seller initiated transactions.
The uniform risk profile, relatively more complete markets due to the consistent treatment
of principal and interest payments, existence of the STRIPS1 program, and implications of
the expectations hypothesis, suggest that a change in the supply of cashflows should not
impact market prices for treasuries.
Much of the event study research on United States Treasury prices focuses on the bill
market. Hughes et al. (2008) examine the volatility effects corresponding to treasury bill
auction events, finding that volatility is high as a bond moves from on-the-run to off-the-run
status. Fleming (2002) shows that Treasury bill reopenings occur with lower prices, finding
the effect of greater supply dominates the possible liquidity benefit that might drive prices
1 Acronym for Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of Securities. The STRIPS program
designates securities which may be divided or stripped by financial institutions into separately traded zero-
coupon instruments representing single principal or interest payments from a note or bond.
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higher. This result suggests that additional supply of a perfect substitute, that is, additional
supplies of identical cashflows, lower the market price of the existing securities. Balduzzi
et al. (2009), Fleming and Remolona (1999), Babbel et al. (2004), each use intraday data
to study the effects of macroeconomic announcements, orderflow, and transactions size on
bond prices.
This paper employs interday data describing an alternative measure of the yield curve.
Gürkaynak et al. (2007) construct the zero-coupon yield curve from bonds at least twice
off-the-run so that yield changes related to the liquidity premium for on-the-run bonds do
not contaminate measurement. These discount yields provide information on the prices of
less liquid but otherwise substitutable cashflows. Evidence of the effect of auctions on the
off-the-run discount yields shows that the change in the relative supply of cashflows drives
relative prices for seasoned treasuries down, but only in the short term. The result differs
from previous research of off versus on-the-run yields since the supply effect originates from
additional cashflows available at the maturity horizon, and the yields are constructed from
a set of assets with uniform liquidity. Since the yields are constructed from the universe of
treasuries excluding bonds which are on-the-run or first-off-the-run, the auction effect is not
attributable to a liquidity premium.
Hypothesis: An increase in the supply of cashflows at a particular maturity
reduces relative prices, and increases relative yields at that horizon.
Well documented Treasury auction events mark changes in the supply of bonds. Exami-
nation of the simultaneous effects on the yield curve through use of event study methodology
provides a measure of the effect.
Since auctions increase the supply of cashflows at the auction maturity horizon, prices
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for substitutes, the existing matching-maturity cashflows, fall. This effect manifests as a
statistically significant increase of change of relative yields. These changes in relative yield
measure the extent to which the price of bonds at the auction horizon are driven down with
an increase in the supply of close substitutes, relative to changes in prices of less perfect
substitutes—alternative maturity cashflows.
The time series of discount yields across the available term structure permits the exami-
nation of this effect. Letting Y
(n)
t equal the relative yield at maturity horizon n, the general




where X(n) equals the supply of cashflows at maturity horizon n. Specifically, defining A to
be the set of dates k when auction events occur, the hypothesis can be stated as:
∆Y
(n)
t > 0, where t ∈ {A}. (4.2)
Results of hypothesis tests appear in section 4.5 utilizing data and methods described in
sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.
4.2.1 Event Definition and Data
Yield Curve:
The empirical methodology used by Gürkaynak et al. (2007) provides discount yields derived
from the prices of off-the-run Treasury bonds at annual increments. The data spans 1961 to
the recent past.
The maturity structure of the debt limits the horizons for which the discount yield curve
can be estimated. Figure 4.1 displays a sample of the yield curve data employed in this
study. Vertical lines show the date of inclusion for 16 to 20 and 21 through 30-year yields.
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In the period under study, prices of off-the-run treasuries determine the discount rates for
one to 15 years over the first seven months of 1981, at one to 20-year horizons until 1985,
and after November of 1985, one to 30 years.
Auction Distribution:
The U.S. Treasury website treasurydirect.org provides detailed auction data since 1980.
Figure 4.2 shows the size, timing, and maturity for the Treasury auctions of securities with
maturity of at least one year for the period between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 2007.
The top frame displays the timing of auction events against maturity, the bottom frame the
face value of the auction.
Figure 4.2 demonstrates that the distribution and frequency of auctions exhibits con-
siderable variation over the sample period. Figure 4.3 summarizes the schedule of auction
events by month, across maturity horizons. In general, auctions for 52-week bills occur ev-
ery four weeks. Two-year notes are typically auctioned in the second half of each month,
three and ten-year note and thirty-year bond auctions typically occur in the first half of the
month, quarterly, on a February-May-August-November schedule. Five-year note auctions
occur in the second half of the month on the same (February-May-August-November) quar-
terly schedule until 1991 when the frequency increases and auctions are conducted monthly.
Beginning in 1998 the schedule for five-year auctions returns to midquarters, but shifts to
the first half of the month.
Until discontinued in 1991, four-year notes are auctioned on a quarterly schedule begin-
ning in March. Twenty-year notes were on a similar schedule. These March-June-September-
December auctions occur in the second half of the month. Seven-year auctions occur on an
approximately quarterly schedule, beginning either in January or March each year.
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The top frame of Figure 4.4 shows the total value of accepted offers at auction across all
maturity horizons, by month, between January 1981 and December 2007. The lower frame
shows detail from a subsample of the data. The subperiod of detail includes March of 1996,
when no securities were auctioned due to the debt ceiling legislation debate. Auction face
values are high in February, May, August, and November due to the three, five, ten, and
thirty-year auctions which occur in those months.
Figure 4.5 shows a subsample of the data from Figure 4.2 detailing the distribution of
auctions by maturity and the face value at auction over one year, between 1990 and 1991.
During this period, auctions for one, two, three, five, ten and thirty-year maturities occur
in each of the months of February, May, August, and November. This subperiod also shows
the transition from quarterly to monthly five-year note auctions.
The top frame of Figure 4.6 shows a scatter diagram of years to maturity against days
between announcement and auction. The lower frame shows the days between announcement
and issuance against days between announcement and auction. Most very short-term cash-
management bills are announced only a few days before the auction, and longer-term notes
and bonds generally have longer periods between announcement and auction. Exceptions
include a nine year 11 month note announced and auctioned on the same day in October of
2001, and issued the next day. Two five-year notes were announced one day before the auction
in 2005, although, like the three and four-year notes announced one day before their auctions
in 1987 and 1985, respectively, weren’t issued until the following week. Since the present
study examines the longer-term treasury market, and Gürkaynak et al. (2007) construct the
discount-yield curve excluding short-term bills in their estimation, cash-management and
other short-term bill auctions are not shown in the figures for the good of clarity.
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4.3 Empirical Method
This section describes the event study methodology employed to address auction effects on
the yield curve. The procedure is adapted from the treatment of Campbell et al. (1997) and
MacKinlay (1997). For adaptability to other cases, their procedure, outlined here, uses the
v for the response vector under study.




Date T1 represents the eve of the event, T2 the end of the event window. Each date t can
be referenced in terms of its distance from an auction event. For this type of ordering, the
index τ is used with reference to a particular auction event.
Let the difference between the observed and expected value of v be defined as ξ. For
each priced asset i, let the T2 × 1 vector, ξ̂(N)i with kth element, equal to
ξ̂ik = vik − E (vik) , (4.3)
represent the “abnormal return” over the event window. The appropriate model for expec-
tations over the event window is informed by the question under study. Candidates include
CAPM or APT for equity returns, constant mean, or other model.
In general, the model expressed in terms of linear regression as:
vi = Xiδi + εi, (4.4)








ε̂i = vi − Xiδ̂i (4.6)
σ̂2εi =
1
n − k ε̂
′
iε̂i (4.7)





The conditional expectation and variance of (4.3), where X∗i holds the observed explanatory

















The second term of (4.10) equals the variance contribution of the uncertainty of parameter
estimation from (4.4) which decreases to zero with increasing sample period length.
Over the event window, the cumulative abnormal return for each security equals the
deviation from the expected value of the market model in the interval [τ1, τ2], where T1 <





























σ2i (τ1, τ2), (4.14)
it follows that under the null hypothesis, the event having no impact on the mean or variance
of ξi, (from (4.9) and (4.10)), ξi ∼ N (0,Vi). Therefore,
ĈARi(τ1, τ2) ∼ N
(




CARi(τ1, τ2) ∼ N
(
0, σ̄2i (τ1, τ2)
)
. (4.16)







where θ is distributed as Student’s t with T , degrees of freedom, where T corresponds to the
size of the estimation window for computing variance estimate σ2ξi.
MacKinlay (1997) describes a modification of the null hypothesis which uses the sample














ĈARi(τ1, τ2) − CAR(τ1, τ2)
)2
. (4.19)
The null hypothesis in this specification, that the event has no effect on mean returns,




Notation throughout sets y
(N)
t equal to the discount rate at time t for cashflows which occur













the difference between the yield to maturity and the average yield over the T maturity
horizons across the term structure at time t. Auctions within six months of a particular
maturity horizon are classified with the nearest maturity class. For example, 29-year 6-
month auctions are included within the 30-year category.
The normalization of yields using the average across the term structure is motivated by
the desire to smooth effects which may be related to a particularly active maturity, while
capturing the relationship between auction events and relative yields. For example, since
the one-year horizon has an auction every four weeks, examining the change in the term




t , as associated with n-year auctions, would introduce noise
particularly related to the 1-year auction schedule.
Changes in relative yields are measured using a fixed maturity horizon. The distinction
between yield changes expressed this way, and the price of the corresponding synthetic
discount bond to changes in the price or holding period return of an actual discount bond
is that the maturity horizon is unchanged. ∆y
(N)
t equals the change in yield on a discount





k+1, the term to maturity of each yield equals N years. The series Y
(N)
t is centered
around the average curvature of the yield curve by subtracting off the average level of yields
at each time t. Figure 4.7 shows the levels and first differences of two, seven, and thirty-year
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discount yields to maturity in excess of the average.
Modeling the expected value of the change in Y
(N)
jτ equal to zero, where τ measures the
time of the observation with respect to an auction j,
ĈAR
(N)












An estimate of the population variance of abnormal returns, in this case deviations from the
zero-mean expectations of changes in relative yields, is estimated from the subset of business
days without an auction event occurring in any maturity tranche two days before or after







= (τ2 − τ1 + 1)σ2ξ(N)i , (4.23)




. Estimation of variance occurs
over a subsample of the data constructed by eliminating observations within two business
days of an auction at any horizon. This procedure determines the sample for estimation of
variance which equals 3768 observations, 53.5 percent of the sample for yields on maturities
between one and 15 years. Maturity horizons 16 through 20 years supply 3711 observations,

















The subscript τ represents the observation date with respect to auction event centered at
τ = 0. For example, ∆Y
(3)
k0 equals the change in Y between the day before and of the kth
auction at the three-year horizon. Equation (4.24) shows the average of changes in relative
yield at the K auction events for maturity horizon N . This notation agrees with (4.21)
where each ĈAR
(N)
j measures the cumulative abnormal returns over one auction event, such
that the change at the date of the auction equals
CAR
(N)











Figure 4.8 displays the average cumulative changes in relative yield to maturity, for a 10











, for m ∈ {−5..4}. (4.26)
The horizontal axis of Figure 4.8 shows periods before and after the date of the auction event,
marked by a vertical line, at τ = 0. The vertical axis measures the average over auctions
cumulative abnormal return based on the zero-mean expectations model. Each point on
the curve measures the cumulative change in the deviation from average yield to maturity
starting five days before the auction event until four days after.
The peaks at τ = 0 show high cumulative changes in relative yields centered at auction
events at most maturities. This graphical summary of the event study suggests a positive
relationship between the auction event and the relative off-the-run Treasury yields. For
example, average prices of cashflows at horizons other than two years are relatively more
expensive when new two-year cashflows are made available. The decline observed in the
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subsequent periods shows that the effect on these relative yields is temporary.
Figure 4.9 shows the results from a specification of the event study procedure described
in section 4.3. The procedure tests for significance of the slope of the peaks shown in Figure
4.8 between periods τ = −1 and τ = 0, the change in relative yield at the auction event.
In addition to tests of the relationship between the event at the auction horizon and
relative yields at that maturity, Figure 4.9 shows test statistics calculated against maturities
other than the auction horizon. For instance, Figure 4.8 does not show the behavior of
relative yields at the 4-year horizon at windows centered at auctions of 2-year notes. The
curves in Figure 4.9 show results of hypothesis tests that auctions of the maturity noted in
the caption have no effect on neighboring or more distant relative yields, measured across the
horizontal axis. The solid line displays the t-statistic measured on the vertical axis against






























is estimated using the variance of yield in excess of the average
for each day in the sample at least 2 days before or after any auction—of any maturity.
The dotted lines in each frame of Figure 4.9 show the test statistic against the null of no
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The test statistic θ′1 does not rely on the subsample of dates outside two days of the auction
event to produce an estimate of the variance. Solid horizontal lines represent test statistics
equal to positive or negative 1.96. The sample size for estimating the variance of CAR ex-
ceeds 2000 for each horizon and thus the test statistic is approximately normally distributed.
The null hypothesis is rejected against the hypothesis that auctions have no impact on
relative yields of the auction’s maturity for horizons of one, two, three, four, and seven years
in favor of the hypothesis that the own maturity effect on relative yields is positive. The
effect of 20-year auctions on the discount yields of 20 years and greater are not calculated
since the availability of these long-term discount yields does not overlap the period when
20-year auctions are conducted.
Additionally, auction horizons which exhibit a positive effect on own-maturity relative
yields show pattern of influence over neighboring maturities. For example, the four-year
auction frame in Figure 4.9 shows the test statistic against the hypothesis that the auction
of four-year bonds has no effect on the relative yield of the five-year relative discount yield.
This hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level.
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4.5.1 Auction Size and Yield Effects















k equals the change in relative yield at horizon N for each of k auctions. The
right-hand-side variable S(N) − S̄(N) equals the size of auction k less the average auction size
at horizon N . The deviation from mean of the right-hand side clarifies the intuition of the
model, as an auction of size zero is undefined. The parameter estimate for the effect of the
size of auction is insignificant at each horizon. The insignificance of parameter estimates for
the relative size suggest auctions influence relative yields at their maturities regardless of
size. However, the auction event itself contains little new information with regard to the face
value of the issue, since auction announcements occurring days or weeks before the auction
report an anticipated subscription amount. Participants in the auction determine the market
price for the new debt, information which would not be fully reflected in market prices until
the auction takes place. An analogous event study procedure testing the relationship of
relative yields to announcement dates fails to reject the hypothesis of no effect on relative
yields the 5% level for all maturities.
4.5.2 Expanded Window Surrounding Auction Events
The results of tests reported in Section 4.5 report a significant change in relative yields on
the date of the auction event. The upward slope of cumulative relative yields at the auction
events shown in Figure 4.8 is significant at the one day horizon for each of the shorter term
instruments, except for five-year notes.
The results of tests from expanding the window over differences produces a different
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picture of the effect of auction events. Figure 4.10 shows the test statistics for significance of
changes in yields between dates two days previous and the auction event. The sample from
which variance of the response variable is estimated is reduced to include observations from
dates not within three business days of an auction event at any maturity. Figure 4.11 shows
the test statistics for significance of changes in yields between dates three days previous and
the auction event. The sample from which variance of the response variable is estimated is
reduced to include observations from dates not within four business days of an auction event
at any maturity.
These two tests reveal the peaks in the five-year maturity are significant in the days before
the auction event. Unlike the other maturities which demonstrate significant increases in
relative yields between auction and the date preceding the auction event, the five-year yields
show a significant increase during the period between the date of an auction announcement
leading up to the auction date.
The results discussed in the one day change in relative yields are generally reflected in the
results addressing the change in relative yield between two and three days before the auction
event. The substantive differences are in the three and five-year events. The five-year yields
show a significant positive relationship between auctions and the change in yields for a two
or three-day horizon. The three-year auctions do not demonstrate a positive relationship
between relative yields at any horizon for the two or three-day change in relative yields.
Figure 4.12 shows the test statistics against the null hypothesis of no effect on the change
in relative yield over the period one day before until one day after the auction event. Only
in the one and two-year case do the statistics reject the null of no effect on relative yields
at the maturity of the auction events. In these tests the variance estimator is taken from
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observations without an auction event at any maturity within two business days. The test
statistics reported in Figures 4.12 and 4.13 show equivalent and essentially identical results
as to those found by expanding the event window by an additional day using the formulation





















σ2i (−1, 2), (4.33)
provide variance estimates.
Figure 4.13 shows the test statistics against the null hypothesis of no effect on the change
in relative yield over the period one day before until two days after the auction event. For
these tests the variance estimator is taken from observations without an auction event at any
maturity within four business days. These results, along with the tests finding a significant
effect at the one day change horizon, suggest that the impact of additional supplies of
cashflows at a maturity horizon exert a short-term effect on the relative discount yields. The
three-day change in relative yields straddling the auction event between one day preceding
until two days following the auction are not significantly different from similar three-day
periods across the sample.
4.5.3 Cross-Maturity Auction Effects
A central issue regarding the impact of auction events and yields is related to the regularity
of the auction schedule. Figure 4.15 displays the average cumulative changes in relative yield
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, for m ∈ {−50, 49}. (4.34)
Vertical bold, light, and dashed lines show the date of auctions, announcements, and is-
suance respectively. One and two-year auctions display the most easily recognized pattern,
consistent with the fact that both maturities exhibit significant positive effects on changes
in relative yields and are auctioned on a regular schedule throughout the sample. Two-year
notes auctions occur each month, and one-year bills every four weeks.
The fact that three-year auctions occur only in the months of February, May, August, and
November allows for a straightforward interpretation of the off-auction event peaks exhibited
by the three-year cumulative abnormal returns. Figure 4.16 shows only the three-year frame
from Figure 4.15. Inspection reveals off-auction peaks in cumulative changes in relative
yields around three-year auctions occur 30 days before the auction date and 35 days after.
The solid line marks these peaks between auctions in Figure 4.16.
Three-year auctions occur during the first half of February, May, August, or November.
The average day of the auction is the 7.16th, with standard deviation of 3.16 days. The
graphic of Figure 4.16 shows the relationship of maturity events having an effect across
maturities. The pattern marked by dark vertical bars corresponds to periods 30 days before
and 35 days after three-year auction events. Thirty business days before three-year auction
dates correspond on average to the 25.42th day in December, March, June, and September.
The average day of the month for the 35th business day after three-year auctions equals the
24.99th day of March, June, September, and December. These dates align approximately to
the auctions of two-and four-year notes, shown to exhibit a positive association with relative
yields at the three-year horizon. Two-year auctions occur at the end of every month on
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average date of the 23.89th. Four-year auctions occur almost always on the March-June-
September-December schedule, with the average date of the 23.44th of the month.
4.5.4 Summary of Results
Evidence of a Positive Relationship with Auction Events:
The following subsections describe results from tests of cross and own-maturity effects be-
tween auctions and relative yields for a one-day event window. Equation (4.28) shows the
test statistic for the hypothesis of no change in mean or variance, and (4.30) tests the hy-
pothesis of no change in mean of relative yields at auction events. Test statistics greater than
1.96 suggest rejection of the null at the 5% level. The two tests statistics are in agreement
in every case excluding the relationship between seven-year auctions and six-year yields.
First, the maturities where a positive relationship is observed are discussed, followed by
a discussion of the results at horizons where the results do not show a clear relationship.
One-year Relative Yields
Relative yields at the one-year horizon show a statistically significant positive relationship
with the 254 one-year treasury auctions held between 1981 and 2001. The average change
in relative yield equals 0.81 basis points between the day before and of the auction. Auc-
tions of one-year treasuries have a significant and positive effect on two-year relative yields
corresponding with a 0.585 basis point increase in two-year yields relative to the average.
Two-year Auctions
The 323 two-year auctions events demonstrate positive own maturity effects, yielding an
average increase in two-year relative yields equal to 0.5 basis points. A cross maturity effect
is not observed with significance against the one-year relative yields, although two-year
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auctions are associated with significantly higher three and four-year relative yields of 0.49
and 0.36 basis points respectively.
Three-year Auctions
Eighty-seven auctions of three-year notes correspond to an average of 0.83 basis point in-
creases in three-year relative yields, along with 1.6 and 1.3 basis point increases in the one
and two-year relative yields respectively.
Four-year Auctions
Forty-one four-year auctions occur in the sample period between 1981 and 1991. The average
increase in relative yields on the dates of four-year auctions equals 0.94 basis points. The
auctions correspond with positive changes in five and six-year relative yields equal to 0.92
and 0.8 basis points respectively.
Seven-year Auctions
Forty-nine seven-year auctions occur during the sample period between 1981 and 1993. The
auctions exhibit significant effects at the six through 15-year horizons. At each horizon the
effect measures approximately one basis point of increase in the relative yield.
Summary of Positive Relationship Results:
The descriptions above describe the effect of one, two, three, four, and seven-year auctions on
relative yields at own and neighboring maturities. In these five cases, auctions correspond
with positive changes in relative yields, both at the maturity tranche of the auction and
neighboring horizons. The results suggest a significant decrease in relative prices for existing
bonds when new instruments providing similar cashflows are issued.
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A notable relationship exists between the four and seven-year horizons. Both maturities
show strong own-horizon effects, with auctions affecting neighboring relative yields. Cross
effects involving relative yields at the four-year horizon include the positive effect associated
with three and two-year auctions. Both seven and four-year notes are auctioned almost
exclusively in months other than the February, May, August, and November. Only one four-
year auction occurred in the first days of February. The relative isolation of these auctions
helps explain the strong relationship with relative yields.
Summary of Tests which Fail to Reject Null:
Auctions at the five, ten, twenty, and thirty-year horizons do not correspond with significant
increases in relative yields at auction maturity horizons.
In the case of the 20-year yields, a possible explanation is the small sample size and the
period over which auctions occur. Only 16 auctions overlap with the sample availability
of 20-year yields. The dates spanned by the sixteen 20-year auctions, 1981 through 1986,
exhibit yields unrepresentative of the remainder of the sample. Monetary policy changes, a
period of dramatically decreasing inflation rates, and declining interest rates may be a source
of bias.
Another explanation for the failure to identify supply effects at the five, ten, and thirty-
year horizons is the effect of the auction calendar. Auctions for each of these three maturities
occur primarily in February, May, August, or November. These months correspond to the
majority of auction activity, where the size of auctions are dominated by the issues in the
one, two, and three-year maturity horizons. Significant negative effects on the ten-year yields
from auctions of one and three-year treasuries might contaminate the measurement of own
price effects from the smaller in face value ten-year auctions. Of the 129 ten-year auctions,
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only 45 occur outside two business days of a three-year auction, and only 13 outside of two
business days of an auction at either the three or five-year horizon.
The 30-year relative yields are subject to a combination of possible influences. First, each
auction takes place during the busy February-May-August-November schedule. Second,
since the 30-year bond is the longest maturity instrument issued, the discount cashflows
matching the principal of the newly issued bonds do not exist. Third, the schedule of 30-
year auctions is far less regular than the other maturities. Between 1986 and 1994 auctions
occur in each month in the February-May-August-November schedule. Between 1994 and
2006 the schedule decreases to include only February and August, adding November in 1996
through 1999, and returning to a schedule including both May and November in 2007. This
irregularity suggests that the thirty-year schedule may retain some tactical component not
obviously reflected in the schedules of other maturities. It is possible that measurement error
from estimating these zero-coupon rates, the fact direct substitutes are unavailable, and the
possibility that the auctions are more tactical than those at other maturities explains the
absence of a clear relationship in the case of thirty-year relative yields.
4.5.5 Non-parametric Test Statistics
The empirical procedure outlined in Section 4.3 requires assumptions about the distribution
and model of expected returns. Campbell et al. (1997) describe a nonparametric test based
on the sign of the abnormal return.
Let N equal the total number of events and N+ the number of cases where the ĈAR
is positive. Under the null hypothesis, that with equal probability ĈAR will be positive or
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is asymptotically distributed N (0, 1) as N increases. The null hypothesis H0 : p ≤ 0.5 where
p = Pr(ĈAR > 0) is rejected in favor of the alternative HA : p > 0.5 for a test of size α
if θ∗ > Φ−1(α). Figure 4.17 shows nonparametric test statistics from equation (4.35) for
tests of one-day changes in relative yields. The results compare with test statistics shown in
Figure 4.9. The nonparametric statistics either rejects or fails to reject the null hypothesis
for own maturity horizons in agreement with the parametric statistics at each of the nine
auction horizons.
4.6 Extensions
4.6.1 Auction Impact on Yields Adjusted for Expected Inflation
It is clear from Figure 4.1 that yields across all maturity horizons have fallen considerably
and fairly consistently between 1981 and 2008. This pattern can be explained in part by the
change in expected inflation between 1981 and 2008.









equation (4.36) shows the expected change in the N -year yield as the change in ex post
expected inflation between dates t and t + 1. The value of ∆π̂t equals the incremental






(πe0 − πeM ) (4.37)
with t = 0 corresponding to January 1, 1981 and M = 9861, December 31, 2007.2 The
annualized inflation rate, constructed from the All Urban Consumers CPI (CPIAUCNS)
series at the St. Louis FRED, equals the change in log value of the non-seasonally adjusted
consumer price index of all urban consumers reported each month. Expected inflation πe
equals the geometric average of inflation over the previous year.








Figure 4.18 summarizes the data on yields, inflation, and changes in discounted yields includ-
ing an expected inflation risk adjustment. The top frame shows the discount yields for the
two, ten, and thirty-year maturities, the 12-month rolling-average inflation rate as described
in equation (4.38) and the trend in inflation between January 1981 and December 2007, the
known rate of change in expected inflation over the sample period. The lower frame shows






t − π̂t. (4.39)
Figure 4.19 shows the average cumulative changes in the inflation corrected yield curve,
∆Y(π)
(N)
t for a 50 day window around each auction event. Cyclical patterns are evident
surrounding the auction events, although a similar technique examining abnormal returns
2There are 9861 days between 1-1-1981 and 12-31-2007. The data for the study uses only business days,
while the change in expected inflation is modeled as continuous over all days. The effect of this adjustment
is that the change between Friday and Monday includes the correction for the preceding weekend.
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shows insignificance in tests at horizons. As in the relative yield specification, the variance
estimator is the subsample variance from all days without an auction event within two busi-
ness days. Figures 4.20 through 4.25 show results from an analogous set of tests examining
the two and three-day changes in inflation corrected yields, along with tests for the change
between days previous and subsequent to the auction event. These results do not suggest
a strong relationship between auction events and yields corrected for inflation using the
average decrease in the inflation rate.
Alternative specifications employing inflation expectations from the University of Michi-
gan or Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank find similar results. A plausible explanation is
the frequency and precision mismatch of both the reported survey data and the mechanism
by which market participants update their expectation of future inflation rates. The signifi-
cant effect of auctions on relative yields is short lived and relatively small in comparison to
the correction derived from monthly observations of consumer prices. The term structure
of inflation expectations cannot be completely observed from the one or five year survey
data, and derived daily changes in inflation expectation may be subject to measurement
error larger than the observable effect of the auction event on yields. The average standard
deviation of Michigan survey respondents estimates between 1979 and 2009 equals 4.64%,
with an average inter-quartile range of 3.5%.
The use of TIPS zero-coupon yields in an effort to remove the inflation expectation
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approach is complicated by a number of factors. The sample for one through thirty-year
TIPS yields begins in 2004, and differences between these real yields and the nominal off-
the-run rates may not be interpreted as breakeven inflation due to considerable differences in
liquidity between bonds trading in these separate markets. Additional robustness checks of
the off-the-run results using alternate subsets or individual yields as level corrections produce
results similar (and often stronger) than those from Section 4.5. The normalization by the
average yields is favored for its parsimony and avoidance of maturity specific effects which
would be encountered using yields of a specific instrument or horizon. As liquidity in the
TIPS market becomes better understood, the real yields may provide an additional avenue
for analysis.
4.6.2 On-the-run Zero-Coupon Yields
Bloomberg Professional supplies a collection of zero-coupon yields constructed from a sample
of on and off-the-run treasury prices for the one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine,
ten, fifteen, twenty, and thirty-year maturity horizons. The daily coverage of the on/off-the-
run zero-coupon curve begins April 28, 1989, with spot rates calculated using the on-the-run
issue for each maturity, where available, and off-the-run issues with nearest maturity for
those horizons where on-the-run issues do not exist. Auction events of neighboring maturities
correspond to changes in which off-the-run bond is used in the construction of the curve.
Figure 4.26 show a subset of the available yields over the sample period, along with the
distribution and size of auction events. There are zero twenty-year auctions during this
period, and only seven and 16 auctions at the four and seven-year horizons respectively.
The zero-coupon yields are constructed from the par coupon curve using a proprietary
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algorithm. The documentation on zero-coupon yield curves in the Bloomberg documentation
describe the procedure for the construction. The par coupon curve is put into a canonical
form by fitting yields at 6-month intervals across the 30-year span of the yield curve. The
canonical coupon curve is stripped into a spot curve specified in bond-equivalent yields.
While the exact methodology of the construction of this off-the-run curve is unavailable, the
relationship between the continuously compounded yields of Gürkaynak et al. (2007) and
on/off-the-run (converted to continuously compounded rates) shown in Figure 4.27 exhibits
properties in line with expectations and previous research. Figure 4.28 shows the available
data for the ten-year horizon, along with a closer detail of the premium between the on and
off-the-run yields, with auction events marked by vertical lines.











, for m ∈ {−5..4}. (4.42)
















t is the yield constructed from the benchmark off/on-the-run curve. Figure 4.30
shows the cumulative change over a 50 day window.
One through ten-year yields construct the average level of interest rates. Coverage of the
on/off-the-run yields does not include the 11 through 14 or 21 through 29-year rates, and
the 20-year on/off-the-run rate exhibits a jump in 1999 where additional bond prices are
included in the estimation data used to construct the yields. This choice is not particularly
disruptive since zero twenty-year auctions occur during the subsample.3
3The empirical results from studies of the Gürkaynak et al. (2007) off-the-run yield curve using relative
yields constructed from only the one through ten-year rates produce nearly identical results as those using
the entire available yield curve.
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Figures 4.31, 4.32, and 4.33 show results for hypothesis tests on the one, two, and three-
day changes in relative yields from the on/off-the-run curve. The one-day change at auction
fails to reject the null of no effect on relative yields at the two, four, and ten-year horizon. In
contrast to the off-the-run results, the five-year relative yields display a significantly negative
relationship with five-year auctions, and the thirty-year rate is positively related to auctions
for the off/on-the-run curve where no relationship is detected for off-the-run yields.
4.6.3 Departures from Off-the-run Results
The first three tests, against the null hypothesis of no effect on relative yields at auction
horizons over the one, two, and three-day changes leading up to the auction event, are
considerably different from the off-the-run results. Where the off-the-run yields show a
positive difference at the shorter-term horizons leading up to the auction, this effect is
largely unobserved in the on/off-the-run data. Only one and thirty-year relative yields are
significantly higher between three days before and the day of the auction. For off-the-run
bonds, this relationship is evident at the one, two, four, five, and seven-year horizons.
Figures 4.34 and 4.35 show test results using off/on-the-run relative yields at auction
horizons. Relative yields are significantly lower than the day before the auction event at the
five, ten, and thirty-year horizons. These results contrast the off-the-run results, where yields
demonstrated no significant difference for changes between one day previous and one or more
days following the auction. The results based on the curve derived from mainly on-the-run
bonds shows a significant negative relative yield effect between the previous and two days
following the auction, suggesting the liquidity premium paid for newly issued five, ten, and
thirty-year bonds is more persistent than the absorption effect observed in the off-the-run
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study. As Figure 4.37 shows, the change in relative yields between the previous and four
days following the auction event is significantly negative for the five, ten, and thirty-year
horizon. The positive relationship of the three-year yields at that interval may be explained
by the same cross-maturity effect observed from the off-the-run results.
Comparing the on and off-the-run yields directly is problematic due to the differences
in construction of the data. However, the implications of these two sets of results will be
reflected in direct estimation of the effect of auction events on the on and off-the-run yield
spread. A similar battery of tests finds the own-maturity effect of auctions to be significantly
negative at the one-year horizon over the preceding and several days following the auction
event. This effect suggests that the positive relationship observed of one-year auctions on
the one-year rates dominates the same positive relationship observed in the off-the-run yield
data. One explanation for this effect is the segmentation of the treasury bill and longer term
instrument market. The one-year bonds are issued once every four weeks, and the treasury
bill auction schedule is much more closely linked to these short-term instruments. While
a ten or thirty-year instrument will be on-the-run for several months, the one-year bond’s
status will be quickly downgraded, and the instrument will be exposed to more activity in
terms of neighboring auction events or reopenings of the same issue. Insignificance of one-
day changes in the on and off-the-run spread at all horizons other than one and two years is
consistent with the effect of the liquidity premium and absorption effect working in opposite
directions.
At the five, ten, and thirty-year horizons, the effect on the spread between the off and on-
the-run yields is positive and the effect persists comparably to the results from on/off-the-run
relative yield tests, consistent from the implications of the independent results above.
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4.7 Conclusion
A set of high-frequency discount yields, spanning the term structure serves an invaluable
function in economic research. Results reported here show that relative discount yields,
derived from prices of at least twice off-the-run U.S. Treasuries are not insulated from the
institutional effects of the auction calendar. The cycles of the institutional framework cor-
respond to a statistically significant pattern of variation in relative yields affecting every
maturity horizon. Additionally, the results suggest an absorption effect related to the in-
crease in cashflows at auction horizons at most maturities. Although the effect is short lived,
the impact could exert unexpected influence on empirical results, especially for phenomenon
which are associated with the auction schedule either through design or by coincidence.
Additionally, an analogous event study addresses yields constructed from a smaller col-
lection of primarily on-the-run treasuries. These yields exhibit a different relationship with
auction events. Similar to the evidence from the off-the-run yields, the days preceding an
auction event correspond to significant increases in relative yields at most horizons, the rel-
ative yields at the benchmark five, ten, and thirty-year horizons exhibit significant declines
in the period following the auction event. In contrast, relative yields derived from the off-
the-run curve do not exhibit changes in relative yields significantly different from zero two
or three days after the auction events at all but the seven-year horizon. The influence of
auction events has a temporary and significant effect on the off-the-run yield curve.
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Figure 4.1: Yield Curve Data Sample
The top frame shows a sample of data on daily discount yields of Gürkaynak et al. (2007). These
continuously compounded zero-coupon discount rates are computed using off-the-run treasuries.
The two vertical lines show the periods where 16 through 20-year rates (in 1981), and where 21
through 30-year rates are included (in late 1985).
The bottom frame shows the difference between the one and 2,7,10,20, and 30-year rates.
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Figure 4.2: Auction Event Timing Across Maturity Horizons.
The figure below shows the timing of Treasury Auctions between January 1981 and 2008. Each
symbol in the top frame represents an auction at the maturity horizon shown in the vertical axis.
The bottom frame shows the total quantity accepted in each auction, in billions of dollars. The
symbols in the lower frame correspond to symbols used for each maturity horizon shown in the top
frame. The two vertical bars show the dates that coverage begins for 16 through 20-year (in 1981)
and 21 through 30-year (late 1985) discount rates.






















































Figure 4.3: Monthly Auction Distribution by Maturity Horizon.
The figure below shows the distribution of auction events across calendar months for each maturity
horizon. Each frame corresponds to a maturity horizon. The horizontal axis corresponds to the









































































Figure 4.4: Face Value of Auction Events by Month.
The top frame shows the face value of all auctions during each month between January 1981 and
December 2007. The bottom frame shows a subsample of the data for the dates between January
1993 and December 1996. Ticks on the horizontal axis correspond to end of months. Zero auctions
occur in March of 1996 during due to the unfinished legislative debate to increase the Federal debt
ceiling.

























































Figure 4.5: Auction Event Timing Across Maturity Horizons.
The figures below show a subsample from Figure 4.2. The top frame shows the timing of Treasury
Auctions between July, 1990 and June, 1991. Each symbol in the top frame represents an auction
at the maturity horizon shown in the vertical axis.
The bottom frame shows the total quantity accepted in each auction, measured on the vertical axis
in billions of dollars. The symbols in the lower frame correspond to symbols used for each maturity
horizon shown in the top frame.

























































Figure 4.6: Auction and Announcement Timing
The figure below shows the time between the announcement and auctions of Treasury Auctions
between January 1981 and 2008.
The top frame shows the relationship between maturity and days between announcement and
auction. The vertical axis shows the maturity horizon in years, and the horizontal axis the days
between announcement and auction.
The bottom frame shows the relationship of days between announcement and issuance and days
between the announcement and auction. The dashed diagonal is the 45 degree line.
























































Figure 4.7: Relative Yield Data
The top frame of the figure below shows discount yield deviations from mean expressed in basis
points for the daily discount yields of Gürkaynak et al. (2007). These continuously compounded

















t , takes N equal to the
longest maturity available at time t.






in basis points. The time series are constructed from the discount yields of Gürkaynak et al. (2007).









































Figure 4.8: Cumulative Changes in Relative Yield
The figure shows the cumulative changes in relative yields over a period beginning 5 business days
before until 4 days following an auction, expressed in basis points. Each frame shows the period
around the auction event of the maturity horizon shown in the top left corner. Dark solid vertical

















































































Figure 4.9: Test Statistics for Auction Event Studies on Relative Yields.
The frames below show test statistics against the null hypothesis of no effect of auctions on relative
yields. Each point on the curve represents the t-statistic for the hypothesis that the auction event at
the horizon shown in the top corner has no effect on the relative yields shown across the horizontal













where each Y(N)k is the yield in excess of the average on the day of the auction event, and each j
are dates at least 3 days before or after any auction. The dotted lines in each frame show the test





















This test does not rely on the subsample of dates not within two days of the auction event to
produce an estimate of the variance. The horizontal axis shows the response horizon, each frame
represents auctions in different maturity classes. Auctions within 6 months of a particular maturity
horizon are considered within the nearest class. For example, 29 year 6-month auctions are included































































Table 4.1: Auction Size and Relative Yield OLS Results.
The table below shows the results of ordinary least squares estimates of the relationship between












Horizon Variable Estimate St.Err. t-stat p-value R2
1-year
α(1) 0.00810827 0.00297869 2.72209429 0.00693971
0.0134
S(1) − S̄(1) −0.00123738 0.00082975 −1.49127461 0.13714011
2-year
α(2) 0.00501218 0.00179174 2.72516022 0.00678170
0.0011
S(2) − S̄(2) −0.00013706 0.00024168 −0.56712942 0.57102511
3-year
α(3) 0.00829705 0.00352987 2.35052232 0.02106282
0.0003
S(3) − S̄(3) 0.00008514 0.00070641 0.12053141 0.90434666
4-year
α(4) 0.00936435 0.00362084 2.58623600 0.01355168
0.0037
S(4) − S̄(4) -0.00082795 0.00259242 -0.31937336 0.75114791
5-year
α(5) 0.00029270 0.00162983 0.17958849 0.85765837
0.0001
S(5) − S̄(5) −0.00005741 0.00053440 −0.10742073 0.91456343
7-year
α(7) 0.01014952 0.00409662 2.47753833 0.01688048
0.0001
S(7) − S̄(7) 0.00014630 0.00307886 0.04751843 0.96230139
10-year
α(10) −0.00069413 0.00119819 -0.57932000 0.56341585
0.0001
S(10) − S̄(10) −0.00006333 0.00040879 −0.15491038 0.87714183
20-year
α(20) 0.00002792 0.01426050 0.00195762 0.99846567
0.0174
S(20) − S̄(20) 0.00848717 0.01786987 0.47494280 0.64215176
30-year
α(30) 0.00722586 0.00582310 1.24089613 0.22021338
0.0061
S(30) − S̄(30) 0.00181655 0.00291414 0.62335717 0.53577458
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Figure 4.10: Auction Event Studies on Two-day Changes in Relative Yields.
The frames below show test statistics against the null hypothesis of no effect of auctions on the two-
day change in relative yields. Each point on the curve represents the t-statistic for the hypothesis
that the auction event at the horizon shown in the top corner has no effect on the relative yields
shown across the horizontal axis. The solid line shows the test against the hypothesis of no change





















k−i, the change in yield in excess of the average on the day of the
auction event, and each j are dates at least 4 days before or after any auction. The dotted lines in





















This test does not rely on the subsample of dates not within two days of the auction event to
produce an estimate of the variance. The horizontal axis shows the response horizon, each frame
represents auctions in different maturity classes. Auctions within 6 months of a particular maturity



































































Figure 4.11: Auction Event Studies on Three-day Changes in Relative Yields.
The frames below show test statistics against the null hypothesis of no effect of auctions on relative
yields. Each point on the curve represents the t-statistic for the hypothesis that the auction event at
the horizon shown in the top corner has no effect on the relative yields shown across the horizontal
axis. The solid line shows the test against the hypothesis of no change in either the mean or




















k−i, the change in yield in excess of the average on the day of the
auction event, and each j are dates at least 5 days before or after any auction. The dotted lines in























The horizontal axis shows the response horizon, each frame represents auctions in different maturity
classes. Auctions within 6 months of a particular maturity horizon are considered within the nearest



































































Figure 4.12: Changes in Relative Yields Between Previous and Following Day.
The frames below show test statistics against the null hypothesis of no effect of auctions on relative
yields. Each point on the curve represents the t-statistic for the hypothesis that the auction event at
the horizon shown in the top corner has no effect on the relative yields shown across the horizontal
axis. The solid line shows the test against the hypothesis of no change in either the mean or variance

































equals the change in yield in excess of the average between the day before of the auction event and
the next business day. Each j are dates at least 2 days before or after any auction. The dotted


































The horizontal axis shows the response horizon, each frame represents auctions in different maturity
classes. Auctions within 6 months of a particular maturity horizon are considered within the nearest
































































Figure 4.13: Changes in Relative Yields Between Previous and Two-Business
Days Following Auction.
The frames below show test statistics against the null hypothesis of no effect of auctions on relative
yields. Each point on the curve represents the t-statistic for the hypothesis that the auction event at
the horizon shown in the top corner has no effect on the relative yields shown across the horizontal
axis. The solid line shows the test against the hypothesis of no change in either the mean or

































equals the change in yield in excess of the average between the day before of the auction event and
the next business day. Each j are dates at least 2 days before or after any auction. The dotted


































The horizontal axis shows the response horizon, each frame represents auctions in different maturity
classes. Auctions within 6 months of a particular maturity horizon are considered within the nearest





























































Figure 4.14: Changes in Relative Yields Between Two Days Previous and Day
Following Auction.
The frames below show test statistics against the null hypothesis of no effect of auctions on relative
yields. Each point on the curve represents the t-statistic for the hypothesis that the auction event at
the horizon shown in the top corner has no effect on the relative yields shown across the horizontal
axis. The solid line shows the test against the hypothesis of no change in either the mean or variance

































equals the change in yield in excess of the average between two days before and the day after the
auction event. Each j are dates at least 2 days before or after any auction. The dotted lines in


































The horizontal axis shows the response horizon, each frame represents auctions in different maturity
classes. Auctions within 6 months of a particular maturity horizon are considered within the nearest

































































Figure 4.15: Cumulative Changes in Relative Yield
The figure shows the cumulative changes in relative yields over a period 50 business days preceding
and following an auction, expressed in basis points. Each frame shows the period around the auction
event of the maturity horizon shown in the top left corner. Dark solid vertical lines represent auction












































































Figure 4.16: Cumulative Changes in Relative Yield—Three Year Horizon
The figure shows the cumulative changes in relative yields over a period 50 business days preceding
and following an auction, expressed in basis points for three-year events. Dark solid vertical lines
represent auction events, dashed lines announcements and light solid lines issue dates after auctions.
Thick solid lines mark peaks at 30 days before and 35 days after auction events, corresponding
approximately to auction events in the two and four-year maturity tranches.



















Figure 4.17: Non-Parametric Statistics for Auction Event Studies on Relative
Yields.
The frames below show test statistics against the null hypothesis of no effect of auctions on relative yields. Each point on the
curve represents the t-statistic for the hypothesis that the auction event at the horizon shown in the top corner has no effect on
the relative yields shown across the horizontal axis. The solid line shows the test against the hypothesis of no change in either
















k is the yield in excess of the average on the day of the auction event, and each j are dates at least 3 days





















This test does not rely on the subsample of dates not within two days of the auction event to produce an estimate of the
variance. The horizontal axis shows the response horizon, each frame represents auctions in different maturity classes. Auctions
within 6 months of a particular maturity horizon are considered within the nearest class. For example, 29 year 6-month
auctions are included within the 30 year category.
Let N equal the total number of events and N+ the number of cases where the ĈAR is positive. Under the null hypothesis,










is asymptotically distributed N (0, 1) as N increases. The null hypothesis H0 : p ≤ 0.5 where p = Pr(ĈAR > 0) is rejected in











































































Figure 4.18: Yield Curve and Inflation
The top frame of the figure below shows a sample from the daily discount yields of Gürkaynak et al.
(2007) and inflation measures.
The straight diagonal line represents the incremental change in ex post expected inflation over the
sample period. The expected inflation rate defined as the geometric mean of the previous twelve-
month’s inflation rate equals 10.73% on January 1, 1981 and 4.12% December 31, 2007. The daily
expected inflation rate πe drawn with a dashed line takes the same value for each day of the month,
equal to the 12-month rolling geometric mean of inflation rates.
The lower frame shows the series
Y(π)(N)t = y
(N)
t − π̂t (4.62)
where π̂t equals the period t value for expected ex post inflation.
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Figure 4.19: Cumulative Changes in Expected Inflation Corrected Yields
The figure shows the cumulative changes in expected inflation corrected yields over a period 50
business days preceding and following an auction, expressed in basis points. Each frame shows the
period around the auction event of the maturity horizon shown in the top-left corner. Dark solid















































































Figure 4.20: Test Statistics for Auction Event Studies on Inflation Corrected
Yields.
The frames below show test statistics against the null hypothesis of no effect of auctions on expected
inflation corrected yields. Each point on the curve represents the t-statistic for the hypothesis that
the auction event at the horizon shown in the top corner has no effect on the relative yields shown
across the horizontal axis. The solid line shows the test against the hypothesis of no change in












where each Y(π)(N)k is the yield in excess of the expected inflation rate on the day of the auction
event, modeled as the incremental change in realized inflation rate over the sample period. The



















This test does not rely on the subsample of dates not within two days of the auction event to
produce an estimate of the variance. The horizontal axis shows the response horizon, each frame
represents auctions in different maturity classes. Auctions within 6 months of a particular maturity
horizon are considered within the nearest class. For example, 29 year 6-month auctions are included























































Figure 4.21: Auction Event Studies on Two-day Changes in Inflation Corrected
Yields.
The frames below show test statistics against the null hypothesis of no effect of auctions on inflation
corrected yields. Each point on the curve represents the t-statistic for the hypothesis that the
auction event at the horizon shown in the top corner has no effect on the relative yields shown
across the horizontal axis. The solid line shows the test against the hypothesis of no change in




















k−i, the change in yield in excess of the expected inflation
estimate on the day of the auction event, and each j are dates at least 5 days before or after any






















The horizontal axis shows the response horizon, each frame represents auctions in different maturity
classes. Auctions within 6 months of a particular maturity horizon are considered within the nearest























































Figure 4.22: Auction Event Studies on Three-day Changes in Inflation Corrected
Yields.
The frames below show test statistics against the null hypothesis of no effect of auctions on inflation
corrected yields. Each point on the curve represents the t-statistic for the hypothesis that the
auction event at the horizon shown in the top corner has no effect on the relative yields shown
across the horizontal axis. The solid line shows the test against the hypothesis of no change in




















k−i, the change in yield in excess of the expected inflation
estimate on the day of the auction event, and each j are dates at least 5 days before or after any






















The horizontal axis shows the response horizon, each frame represents auctions in different maturity
classes. Auctions within 6 months of a particular maturity horizon are considered within the nearest























































Figure 4.23: Changes in Relative Yields Between Previous and Following Day.
Each point on the curve represents the t-statistic for the hypothesis that the auction event at the
horizon shown in the top corner has no effect on the inflation corrected yields shown across the
horizontal axis. The solid line shows the test against the hypothesis of no change in either the


































equals the change in yield in excess of the expected inflation estimate between the
day before of the auction event and the next business day. Each j are dates at least 2 days before
or after any auction. The dotted lines in each frame show the test statistic against the null of no



































The horizontal axis shows the response horizon, each frame represents auctions in different maturity
classes. Auctions within 6 months of a particular maturity horizon are considered within the nearest























































Figure 4.24: Changes in Inflation Corrected Yields Between Previous and Two-
Business Days Following Auction.
The frames below show test statistics against the null hypothesis of no effect of auctions on inflation
corrected yields. The solid line shows the test against the hypothesis of no change in either the



































equals the change in yield in excess of the expected inflation estimate between the
day before of the auction event and the next business day. Each j are dates at least 2 days before
or after any auction. The dotted lines in each frame show the test statistic against the null of no



































The horizontal axis shows the response horizon, each frame represents auctions in different maturity
classes. Auctions within 6 months of a particular maturity horizon are considered within the nearest





















































Figure 4.25: Changes in Inflation Corrected Yields Between Two Days Previous
and Day Following Auction.
The frames below show test statistics against the null hypothesis of no effect of auctions on relative
yields. Each point on the curve represents the t-statistic for the hypothesis that the auction event at
the horizon shown in the top corner has no effect on the relative yields shown across the horizontal
axis. The solid line shows the test against the hypothesis of no change in either the mean or variance


































equals the change in yield in excess of the expected inflation estimate between two
days before and the day after the auction event. Each j are dates at least 2 days before or after




































The horizontal axis shows the response horizon, each frame represents auctions in different maturity
classes. Auctions within 6 months of a particular maturity horizon are considered within the nearest

































































Figure 4.26: Auction Event Timing During On/Off-the-run Sample.
The figure below shows the timing of Treasury Auctions between April 27, 1989 and Dec. 31, 2007.
This period corresponds to the availability of Bloomberg on/off-the-run discount yields.
Each symbol in the top frame represents an auction at the maturity horizon shown in the vertical
axis. The bottom frame shows the total quantity accepted in each auction, in billions of dollars.
The symbols in the middle frame correspond to symbols used for each maturity horizon shown in
the top frame. The bottom frame shows discount yields for the two, five, and 30-year maturities,
constructed from a subset of primarily on-the-run bonds.





















































Figure 4.27: Off-the-run Discount Yield Premium
The figure below shows the difference between yields of Gürkaynak et al. (2007) and the on/off-
the-run data series from Bloomberg Professional expressed in basis points. The Bloomberg data,
converted to continuously compounded zero-coupon discount rates, are computed using the set of
on-the-run treasuries and off-the-run treasuries of matching maturity where on-the-run issues are
unavailable.
The jump in the twenty-year series in February of 1999 marks the first day that off-the-run bonds
are used to compute a point at the twenty-year horizon. Before that date the twenty-year rate was
computed using a linear interpolation between the ten and thirty year bonds.



















































































Figure 4.28: Ten-Year Yields from On and Off-the-run Prices
The figure below shows the ten-year yields of Gürkaynak et al. (2007) and the Bloomberg
Professional data on/off-the-run yield series. The Bloomberg data, converted to continuously
compounded zero-coupon discount rates, are computed using the set of on-the-run treasuries and
off-the-run treasuries of matching maturity where on-the-run issues are unavailable.
The bottom frame show a larger view of the 10-year frame from Figure 4.27. Vertical bars mark
ten-year auction events.
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Figure 4.29: Cumulative Changes in Relative on-the-run Yields
The figure shows the cumulative changes in relative yields from the Bloomberg on/off-the-run
discount yield curve over a period beginning 5 business days before until 4 days following an
auction, expressed in basis points. Each frame shows the period around the auction event of the
maturity horizon shown in the top left corner. Dark solid vertical lines represent auction events,
dashed lines announcements and light solid lines issue dates after auctions.
No twenty-year auctions take place during the sample period, and the four and seven-year event







































Figure 4.30: Cumulative Changes in On/Off-the-run Relative Yield
The figure shows the average cumulative changes in on/off-the-run relative yields during the period
50 business days preceding and following an auction, expressed in basis points. Each frame shows
the period around the auction event of the maturity horizon shown in the top left corner. Dark

















































































Figure 4.31: Test Statistics for Auction Event Studies On/Off-the-run Relative
Yields.
The frames below show test statistics against the null hypothesis of no effect of auctions on relative
yields. Each point on the curve represents the t-statistic for the hypothesis that the auction event at
the horizon shown in the top corner has no effect on the relative yields shown across the horizontal












where each oY(N)k is the yield in excess of the average on the day of the auction event, and each j
are dates at least 3 days before or after any auction. The dotted lines in each frame show the test


















This test does not rely on the subsample of dates not within two days of the auction event to
produce an estimate of the variance. The horizontal axis shows the response horizon, each frame
represents auctions in different maturity classes. Auctions within 6 months of a particular maturity
horizon are considered within the nearest class. For example, 29 year 6-month auctions are included
within the 30 year category.




































































Figure 4.32: Event Studies of Two-day Changes in On/Off-the-run Relative
Yields.
The frames below show test statistics against the null hypothesis of no effect of auctions on the
two-day change in relative yields from the on-the-run series. Each point on the curve represents the
t-statistic for the hypothesis that the auction event at the horizon shown in the top corner has no
effect on the relative yields shown across the horizontal axis. The solid line shows the test against
the hypothesis of no change in either the mean or variance of the change in relative yield between


















k−i, the change in yield in excess of the average on the day of
the auction event, and each j are dates at least 4 days before or after any auction. The dotted lines




















This test does not rely on the subsample of dates not within two days of the auction event to
produce an estimate of the variance. The horizontal axis shows the response horizon, each frame
represents auctions in different maturity classes. Auctions within 6 months of a particular maturity
horizon are considered within the nearest class.
























































Figure 4.33: Studies of Three-day Changes in On/Off-the-run Relative Yields.
The frames below show test statistics against the null hypothesis of no effect of auctions on relative
yields from the on-the-run series. Each point on the curve represents the t-statistic for the hypoth-
esis that the auction event at the horizon shown in the top corner has no effect on the relative
yields shown across the horizontal axis. The solid line shows the test against the hypothesis of no
change in either the mean or variance of the change in relative yield between three days before and


















k−i, the change in yield in excess of the average on the day of
the auction event, and each j are dates at least 5 days before or after any auction. The dotted lines




















The horizontal axis shows the response horizon, each frame represents auctions in different maturity
classes. Auctions within 6 months of a particular maturity horizon are considered within the nearest
class. For example, 29 year 6-month auctions are included within the 30 year category.
























































Figure 4.34: Changes in On/Off-the-run Relative Yields Between Previous and
Following Day.
The frames below show test statistics against the null hypothesis of no effect of auctions on relative
yields. Each point on the curve represents the t-statistic for the hypothesis that the auction event at
the horizon shown in the top corner has no effect on the relative yields shown across the horizontal
axis. The solid line shows the test against the hypothesis of no change in either the mean or variance

































equals the change in yield in excess of the average between the day before of the auction event and
the next business day. Each j are dates at least 2 days before or after any auction. The dotted


































The horizontal axis shows the response horizon, each frame represents auctions in different maturity
classes. Auctions within 6 months of a particular maturity horizon are considered within the nearest
class. For example, 29 year 6-month auctions are included within the 30 year category.
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Figure 4.35: Changes in On/Off-the-run Relative Yields Between Previous and
Two-Business Days Following Auction.
The frames below show test statistics against the null hypothesis of no effect of auctions on relative
yields. Each point on the curve represents the t-statistic for the hypothesis that the auction event at
the horizon shown in the top corner has no effect on the relative yields shown across the horizontal
axis. The solid line shows the test against the hypothesis of no change in either the mean or

































equals the change in yield in excess of the average between the day before of the auction event and
the next business day. Each j are dates at least 2 days before or after any auction. The dotted


































The horizontal axis shows the response horizon, each frame represents auctions in different maturity
classes. Auctions within 6 months of a particular maturity horizon are considered within the nearest
class. For example, 29 year 6-month auctions are included within the 30 year category.




























































Figure 4.36: Changes in On/Off-the-run Relative Yields Between Previous and
Three-Business Days Following Auction.
The frames below show test statistics against the null hypothesis of no effect of auctions on relative
yields. Each point on the curve represents the t-statistic for the hypothesis that the auction event at
the horizon shown in the top corner has no effect on the relative yields shown across the horizontal
axis. The solid line shows the test against the hypothesis of no change in either the mean or variance

































equals the change in yield in excess of the average between the day before of the auction event and
the next business day. Each j are dates at least 3 days before or after any auction. The dotted


































The horizontal axis shows the response horizon, each frame represents auctions in different maturity
classes. Auctions within 6 months of a particular maturity horizon are considered within the nearest
class. For example, 29 year 6-month auctions are included within the 30 year category.




























































Figure 4.37: Changes in On/Off-the-run Relative Yields Between Previous and
Four-Business Days Following Auction.
The frames below show test statistics against the null hypothesis of no effect of auctions on relative
yields. Each point on the curve represents the t-statistic for the hypothesis that the auction event at
the horizon shown in the top corner has no effect on the relative yields shown across the horizontal
axis. The solid line shows the test against the hypothesis of no change in either the mean or variance

































equals the change in yield in excess of the average between the day before of the auction event and
the next business day. Each j are dates at least 4 days before or after any auction. The dotted


































The horizontal axis shows the response horizon, each frame represents auctions in different maturity
classes. Auctions within 6 months of a particular maturity horizon are considered within the nearest
class. For example, 29 year 6-month auctions are included within the 30 year category.
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Appendix A
Appendix: The Kalman Filter
A state space model consists of a measurement or observation equation
yt = Cxt + Hαt + et, (A-1)
and transition equation, describing the path of the state variable,
αt = A + Fαt−1 + vt. (A-2)
Where yt is a n × 1 vector observed at time t, and αt a k × 1 vector of unobserved state
variables. The n × k matrix H relates the observed and unobserved components, and the
k×k matrix F relates the k state variables to their lagged values. The n×r matrix C consists
of parameters relating yt to the r× 1 vector of exogenous or predetermined variables xt. Let
E(·) be the expectations operator based on all information available in the previous period





t) = R, and E(vtv
′
t) = Q, ∀t, s, although the correlation restrictions may be relaxed.
The Kalman filter provides a minimum mean-squared-error estimate of an unobserved
state vector α from a two-step algorithm of prediction and updating. For each period t, the
algorithm produces a prediction of αt+1 based on all available up to, and including, t. Then,
1Such as with other notations, given information set Ψ, E(wt|Ψt−1) or Et|t−1.
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at time t + 1, after observing the realized value of the observable variable yt+1, incorporates
the new information included in the prediction error into a forecast for the state vector in
period t + 1.
Given all information available at time t− 1, let the optimal estimator of αt−1 equal at−1
and let E(at) = E(αt), the optimal estimate of αt given information up to time t − 1 be,
E(at) = E(αt) = A + Fat−1. (A-3)
Here, it is important to note the distinction between αt and at. The value of at is based
not only on information from periods {t − 1, t − 2, . . . , 0}, but also the observed value of
yt−1. However, yt−1 was not available to forecast E(at−1), just as the information about yt
is excluded from the prediction of E(at). The vector αt is unobservable, and, thus, only
estimates of its true value can be made.
Let the covariance matrix of the estimation error equal,
Σt−1 = E
[
(αt−1 − at−1)(αt−1 − at−1)′
]
. (A-4)
Again, this differs from the expectation of Σt, written as
E(Σt) = FΣt−1F′ + Q. (A-5)
The former is the value of the estimation error covariance, given all information up to, and
including, that of the current period. Equations (A-3) and (A-5) are the prediction equations
of the Kalman filter.
The updating occurs by finding new values for at+1 and Σt+1, given the new information
observed at time t. These updates are written in terms of the expectations and previous
134
realizations of the state and covariance matrix of the estimation errors.
at = E(at) + E(Σt)H
′B−1(yt − E(yt)) (A-6)




H′B−1(yt − E(yt)), (A-7)
Σt = E(Σt) − E(Σt)H′B−1HE(Σt), (A-8)





= (FΣt−1F′ + Q)H′B−1 (A-10)
the updating equations become
at = A + Fat−1 + Kt(yt − E(yt)) (A-11)
Σt = E(Σt) −KtHE(Σt). (A-12)
The Kalman gain matrix Kt determines the proportion of the present period’s error to be
included in the next period’s estimate of the state vector.
Initiation of the Kalman filter algorithm occurs with appropriately chosen values for
a0 and Σ0. From those values, E(a1) and E(Σ1) are calculated, then used along with y1 to
calculate Σ2 and a2, and so on. For each period t, the prediction error equals vt = yt−E(yt).
Numerical methods can be used to minimize the log likelihood over the parameter space Ψ,
log L(Ψ) = −1
2










Harvey (1989) (pg. 125) provides a complete examination of MLE procedures.
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A.1 Application of the Kalman Filter to the model of
§2.3
In a univariate case as in the model of §2.3, y is a T × 1 vector of observations, x a T × k
non-stochastic matrix and c a k× 1 vector of parameters relating the exogenous data to the
observation series. The measurement equation and transition equations can be written as:
yt = xtc + Hαt (B-1)























This model simplifies to





























With E(η) and E(γ) the elements of a, the optimal predictor of the state variable αt, as in
equation (A-3), and finding at−1 using (A-6) gives,





















Since, as shown in Harvey (1989) (pg 119) that
lim
t→∞





dropping time subscripts, and letting the i, jth element of E(Σ) = σ̂ij ,
K = (FΣF′ + Q)H′B−1 (B-6)


















 σ̂11σ̂11 + σ̂12 + σ̂21 + σ̂22σ̂22
σ̂11 + σ̂12 + σ̂21 + σ̂22
 (B-9)
Since covariance terms equal zero,
K =


























Harvey (1989) (pg. 111) shows that the prediction error
vt = yt − Et−1yt = H(αt − at) + et, ∀t = {1..T}. (B-12)
In this framework, et = 0 ∀t, since that component exists in the state vector as ε. Whether





, with γk = ek,
entering into the measurement equation as Hαt is irrelevant. The vector representation
provided here provides a clearer intuition as to how the prediction error is partitioned, and
how the partition would be incorporated under a different specification of F. Using (B-12),
(B-11) can be written as:


















 σ̂11σ̂11 + σ̂22σ̂22
σ̂11 + σ̂22





and, with Hαt = δt,




ηt + γt − E(ηt) − E(γt)
)
(B-14)
= µ +
σ̂22
σ̂11 + σ̂22
(
δt − E(δt)
)
. (B-15)
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